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Barley production in the United States is concentrated in the northern  plains states,
contiguous to the principle growing regions in Canada. Both regions are surplus producers
and therefore potential competitors. Traditionally, barley trade between the U.S. and
Canada was negligible.  However, recent changes in the policy, institutional  and
competitive environment have led to increased trade and a rise in trade tensions.
From a policy perspective, the North American barley market presents some
interesting  contradictions. In the United States, barley supplies have been managed
through acreage controls, while exports have been subsidized through the Export
Enhancement Program. These policies are intended, in part, to support market prices and
reduce the costs to taxpayers of deficiency payments.  However, higher U.S. prices and
lower prices in subsidized offshore markets have encouraged the influx of Canadian  grain,
particularly  in the more open trading environment that has emerged under the Canadian-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Canada's  agricultural  policies and grain marketing institutions differ drastically
from those of the United States.  The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) holds a monopoly on
barley procurement for uses other than domestic feed.  As a single-seller  agency, the CWB
can target markets through discriminatory  pricing. Canada  does not have explicit acreage
controls.  The government provides an important indirect subsidy to producers through
Western Grain Transportation  Act  (WGTA): rail movements to Vancouver and Thunder
Bay are subsidized by the government, reducing the cost of barley shipments to offshore
markets and the eastern United States.  Grain handling  costs are high relative to those in
the United States.  This creates an incentive to circumvent the Canadian  handling system
through cross-border  truck shipments to U.S. elevators.
Opportunities  for North American barley trade have inspired much debate in
Canada. Recent studies have reached sharply different conclusions about whether the
CWB has been under-selling barley into the U.S. market.  A major liberalization  of barley
marketing was implemented in August, 1993.  The move toward a "Continental  Barley
Market" allowed Canadian  producers or traders to sell directly to U.S. buyers, bypassing
the CWB.  This was reversed through a September court decision after substantial  volumes
of Canadian  barley had been contracted for sale to U.S. buyers.
In addressing  the effects of policy changes, numerous complexities have to be
recognized.  First,  the North American barley market is comprised of many distinct
regional markets.  Prices are connected spatially through transport  and handling costs, but
also reflect impacts of trade  policies (i.e., U.S. tariffs and export subsidies, and Canadian
export permits).  Second, quality factors are an important determinant  of regional  flows,
especially where malting barley is concerned.  Third, there is little published information
on the demand for feed barley at state or province level.  Feed demand ultimately depends
on the size and composition of livestock herds and on the prices of substitute feedstuffs,
which vary by region.
This results  presented in  this paper are based on a detailed, spatial  equilibrium
model of the North American barley market. Results of several policy simulations are
reported. The base case corresponds to a freer trade regime in Canada, as advocated under
the Continental  Barley Market proposal. Other simulations  show effects of U.S. import
viirestrictions;  removal of Canadian  rail subsidies; different EEP subsidy levels; supply
conditions; and retention of CWB control over Canadian  barley sales.  Following are some
of the major results:
*  Canada  has considerable  potential for exporting barley to the United States.  Under
conditions of liberalized barley marketing in Canada--the  Continental Barley
Market proposal--Canadian  exports to the U.S. could reach 3.5 million metric tons.
In base-case simulations, Canada  captures 43% of the U.S. feed barley market, and
24% of the U.S. malting barley market.
*  Using authority under Section 22 of the Agricultural  Adjustment Act, the United
States could restrict barley imports through quotas or tariffs.  If Canadian  barley
were excluded from the U.S. market, U.S. producer  prices would be 8 cents/bu
higher than in the base case.  Canadian  producer  prices would be 20 cents /bu
lower.  A U.S. tariff of approximately $25 per metric ton ($.54/bu) would be
required to completely curtail barley imports from Canada.
*  Elimination of Canadian  rail subsidies (i.e., for movements to Vancouver and
Thunder Bay) would not benefit U.S. producers. To the contrary, simulations
suggest that compensatory rail rates (with Canadian  shippers  paying the full cost of
rail movements) would induce a larger  flow of Canadian  barley into the U.S.
market.
*  The U.S. Export Enhancement Program  has an important impact on North
American barley flows and producer  welfare.  As the EEP bonus is increased,  U.S.
domestic prices rise relative to offshore markets.  This accentuates  pressure  for
Canada  to export barley to the United States.  When Canada's  access to the U.S.
market is constrained  through trade restrictions,  high EEP bonus levels have a
significant, negative impact on Canadian  producer revenue.
*  In recent years, U.S. barley acres have been reduced through the Conservation
Reserve Program. Simulation results suggest that the return of CRP acres to barley
production would lower producer prices in both the United States and Canada
while reducing the volume of U.S. barley imports by  7 percent.
*  In Canada,  regulations  on variety release have limited the production of 6-rowed,
white aleurone malting barley, the type preferred  by most U.S. brewers.
Simulations indicate that if 25% of Canada's  malting barley acreage were shifted
into 6-rowed white varieties, Canada  could capture up to 38 percent of the U.S.
malting barley market.
*  The role of the Canadian  Wheat Board has major implications. Model simulations
were used to evaluate the CWB's allocation  of barley sales between North American
and offshore markets.  Because of demand relationships  embedded in  the model,
results indicate that the CWB's optimal strategy is to expand sales to the United
States beyond levels projected in  the base case.  This gives credence to the view that
the CWB has been underselling barley into the U.S. market, possibly because of the
political sensitivity of these trade  flows.
viii 0  0 VillNORTH AMERICAN  BARLEY TRADE AND  COMPETITION
By Drs.  D. Demcey Johnson and William  W. Wilson*
Introduction
Barley is the third leading cereal crop grown in the world and the United States
and the second most important crop  (by volume) grown in the Canadian prairies.  Barley
production in the United States is concentrated  in the northern plains states, contiguous
to the principal  growing regions in Canada.  Both regions  are surplus producers and,
therefore, potential  competitors.  Traditionally,  barley trade between these two countries
has been negligible.  However, recent changes in the policy; institutional  and competitive
environment have resulted in increased trade and a rise in trade tensions.  Institutional
and policy factors appear to hold potential for further, drastic changes in competitive
relationships and spatial flows.
The study analyzes effects of selected trade and marketing policies on  barley trade
flows, prices  and price differentials,  and economic welfare.  These include impacts of free
trade in North American barley, potential trade restrictions,  and the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program (EEP).  In addition, impacts  of selected marketing policies are
analyzed.  There are important policy tradeoffs for the United States, such as whether the
U.S. should pursue a policy of increasing exports via EEP or of protecting its domestic
market.  Canada confronts  equally difficult issues, including whether to divest the
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB)  of its monopoly over U.S.  sales.
In addressing these questions, numerous  complexities have to be recognized.
First, the North American barley market is comprised of many distinct regional  markets.
Prices are connected spatially through transport and handling costs, but also reflect trade
policies,  such as tariffs, import licenses, and export permits.  Second, quality factors are
an important determinant of regional flows,  especially where malting barley and malt are
concerned.  Third, there is little published information on the demand  for feed barley at
state or province level is small.  Feed demand ultimately depends on the size and
composition  of livestock herds and on the availability and prices of substitute feedstuffs;
these vary drastically  by region.
The centerpiece  of our analysis  is a spatial equilibrium model based on
mathematical  programming.  The model combines regional and industry detail  and
provides a comprehensive  basis for studying the impacts of trade and agricultural  policies,
transportation rates, and supply conditions.  Through model simulations, we gauge the
effects of critical parameters on trade flows,  market shares, and producer prices.
Both traditional and nontraditional  (e.g., prairie-border  crossing) flows  are allowed
in the model.  Supplies are taken as exogenous in each country.  Barley quality
characteristics  vary across states and provinces.  Beer demand  and malt capacity are also
taken as fixed, but quality requirements  vary.  Vertical integration in this sector (i.e.,
ownership by brewers  of individual malt plants) is captured through a set of additional
constraints on malt flows.  Export demand is separated into subsidized and nonsubsidized
*Johnson and Wilson are assistant professor, and professor, respectively, Department
of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.markets.  Feed demand functions are specified for each state and province;  these are
derived from  least-cost feed ration models, which incorporate detailed information on
regional livestock inventories  and prices of substitutes.
The first five sections provide background  to the analysis.  Pressures for change,
and results  from previous  studies, are outlined in the first section.  The second section
describes trends in North American  barley production and trade.  The third section
provides detailed background on malting barley.  The U.S. beer and malting industries
are described in the fourth and fifth sections.  The sixth section describes the analytical
model.  Results of simulations  are described  and presented in the seventh section.  The
report concludes with a summary and discussion of some of the policy issues confronting
this industry.
1.  Pressures Affecting  North American Barley Trade
Both internal and external pressures have emerged for changes  in the U.S.  and
Canadian barley marketing systems.  These generally relate to trade and agricultural
polices, market  dynamics, marketing  policies, and transportation and handling cost
differentials.
Trade and Agricultural Policies
The United States and Canada have different agricultural  policy mechanisms,  and
different regulations governing grain trade.  These have important consequences  for North
American barley.
The Conservation  Reserve Program (CRP) and other supply control mechanisms
have  affected barley production in the United States.  Up to 20-25% of U.S. barley base
acres have been idled under CRP, while the Acreage  Reduction Program  (ARP) set-aside
has averaged  11% of base acreage over the past decade.  EEP has played a major  role in
assisting barley exports, and more recently exports of malt and malting barley.  This
program has the effect of raising domestic prices, creating price spreads (net of
transportation) that favor sales of Canadian barley into U.S. markets.  These price
spreads are apparent at interior shipping points.1
Another important element of U.S. trade and agricultural  policy is Section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  This provides a mechanism whereby  the Secretary  of
Agriculture can impose quotas on imports of a commodity if they adversely affect domestic
farm program operations.  Technically, either an ad valorem import duty of 50% or import
quotas (not to exceed  50% of a representative movement) could be imposed, either through
an emergency action or following study by the U.S. International Trade Commission
(National  Grain Trade Council, p. 1).
1This has accentuated pressure within Canada (i.e., from producers  who are situated
near the border) for dismantling of the Wheat Board's control  over U.S. sales.
2Canada's  policy mechanisms  and marketing system differ drastically.  Unlike the
United States, Canada does not restrict the production of individual grains through
explicit government  intervention.  Acreage  has not been idled through government policies
since the LIFT (Lower Inventory for Tomorrow) program of 1971.
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the fulcrum of many of the marketing and
export policies in the Canadian system.  As a single-seller agency,2 the CWB can target
markets, execute longer-term marketing strategies,  and discriminate among customers
using price and other marketing policies.  This general approach to marketing is
facilitated  by having a monopoly on procurement  and by being able to control imports  and
exports.  However, the CWB competes with non-Board  sales of barley and on-farm feed
use.
Another important feature of the Canadian system  is that subsidies are paid
directly to railroads for a portion of the shipping cost.  While this has a long and
controversial  history within Canada, rail subsidies have recently become  a focal point of
trade disputes with the United States.3  To some extent, U.S. pressure may have
contributed  to Canada's movement  toward reforming the 'method  of payment' of the Crow
subsidy.
In June 1993,  the Minister of Agriculture announced  major reforms of Canada's
marketing system.  The proposed "Continental barley market" would have removed the
CWB's monopoly over North American sales.  Canada's  export licensing scheme was to be
eliminated,  allowing Canadian producers unrestricted  access to U.S. markets. 4  The
reforms were implemented  in August, but were soon reversed through court action.  For
now,  the Canadian Wheat Board retains control over all barley exports.
The U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement  (CUSTA) has no unique features for
barley or malt trade.  Tariffs are to be reduced over a 10-year period.  Rail subsidies are
not allowed on barley shipments to the West Coast, but are allowed for easterly
movements.  The United States retains Section 22 authority.  Canada will retain import
licensing authority for barley and malt until Producer Subsidy Equivalents  (PSE) became
equal in the two countries.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains  a few special
features regarding barley.  Specifically, quotas for exporting to Mexico are allocated to
Canada and the United States;  sales within these quota limits are tariff free.
Policies and marketing mechanisms differ substantially between the United States
and Canada.  Without possibilities for bilateral trade, this would pose no special
difficulties.  However, for different reasons, an open trading environment is seen as
incompatible with existing institutions and policies on both sides of the border.
2  Technically, the CWB has a monopoly on the procurement  of barley for uses other
than domestic feed, including sales of Canadian barley outside of Canada.
3See Wilson for a discussion of these issues and implications in the case of wheat.
4The CWB has authority to issue export permits, which are required to legally ship
barley to any other country, including the United States.
3Market Dynamics
Barley markets have important underlying dynamics  and spatial dimensions.
Beer demand has grown  slowly.  In fact, U.S.  beer consumption has fallen on a per capita
basis, resulting in a growing surplus of malting capacity in the United States.  However,
the international  market for malt has been growing.
The West Coast region is one of the largest feed deficit markets in North America.
This market is traditionally served with midwest corn and barley, both of which incur
relatively high freight costs.  Allegations  are made that this market could be competitively
served from Canada,  particularly Alberta, which is the primary barley production  region
in Canada.
Marketing Policies
Numerous marketing policies  affect the barley sector.  First, major differences
exist in barley quality.  U.S. and Canadian supplies are heterogeneous  (and subject to
much regional variation) in terms of varieties planted and crop quality.  End-use
requirements vary across  brewers, which affects  the demand for specific barley varieties
and malt.  Second,  this industry is subject to a fairly high degree of vertical integration,
as some brewers have acquired malt plants.  Third, handling tariffs in the two countries
reflect different competitive environments.  Complicated rail and truck freight rate
structures exist, resulting from competitive and structural attributes within each country.
Transportation and Handling Costs
There are numerous reasons  for what we refer to as prairie-border-crossing  trade.
These include spatial price differentials and the system of delivery quotas in Canada.
Restrictive delivery quotas and the demand  for cash can induce prairie-border-crossing
shipments by Canadian shippers  or producers.  Spatial price differentials  are affected  by a
number of factors, including quality premiums, EEP subsidies,  and transport and
handling costs.  Because of fundamental differences  in marketing institutions and
philosophies,  Canadian initial payments (and therefore street prices) can differ drastically
from U.S. spot prices.
One of the major differences  in the marketing systems  between  these two
countries  concerns  grain handling and transportation.  There are important structural
differences,  as well as differences  in regulatory environments,  between the United States
and Canada.
Most notable are the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) rail rates and the
related subsidy mechanism.  This results in a pricing regime whereby the shipper pays a
portion of the total rail shipment cost, referred  to as the Shipper's Portion. The balance,
the Government's Cost, is paid directly to the railroads as a subsidy.  These levels and
proportions are adjusted  on an annual basis.5
5In addition, a cap applies to the Canadian Government's  share of total shipping costs.
4These rates  apply to all rail movements of barley and malt from the Prairies to
Vancouver (for offshore export) and Thunder Bay.  Under terms of the CUSTA, exports to
the western United States do not qualify for subsidized rail rates; however, the rates do
apply for shipments through Thunder Bay to the eastern United States.  A proposal has
been made to change these rates, beginning in the 1994/95 crop year.  At issue is the
method of payment (MOP) for the Crow subsidy.  Over a 4-year period, the subsidy
(formerly paid to railroads) would be converted into direct producer payments.  How this
change will be administered has not been determined.  However, most important for this
study is that railroads will be allowed to raise the shipper portion of the rates charged on
WGTA movements,  resulting in lower producer prices in the Prairies.
Notable differences  also exist in the handling systems in the two countries. 6  In
Canada, the Canadian Grain Commission establishes handling regulations for licensed
elevators  and maximum  tariffs for each function  (e.g., storage, country handling,  cleaning,
fobbing).  In contrast, a multitude of competitive forces  in the United States determine
rail rates and handling costs.  Generally, these have resulted in lower handling costs.
Comparisons are made in Figures  1.1 and 1.2, using selected shipping origins and
destinations  used in this study.  Data sources  for these are described on pp. 45-49.  For
Canadian origins, the Government's share of shipping costs is equal to the Crow subsidy.
If the Government were to convert this subsidy into direct producer payments, the costs
borne by Canadian shippers would increase.  Thus, comparisons  of Canadian costs, with
and without the Government share, indicate how changes in the method-of-payment will
affect the costs of shipping Canadian barley.  Handling costs are also shown for both
country and export elevators.  For domestic  movements within North America,  export
elevation  costs do not apply.
The comparisons in Figure 1.1 illustrate the total handling and shipping costs to
two common destinations.  Excluding the government portion, the cost of shipping from
Winnipeg to Thunder Bay is slightly less than the cost of shipping from Larimore, ND to
Duluth.  However,  the effect of the implicit rail subsidy of 190/b is partially offset by the
handling cost differential.  A similar comparison  is made for westbound  shipments, from
Shelby, Montana,  and Lethbridge, Alberta to Pacific ports excluding the government
portion, Canadian shipping costs are less, but the impact of the subsidy (30O/b) is offset to
some extent by the higher handling costs (33¢/b including export elevation, versus  160/b
in the United States).
Figure  1.2 compares shipping costs to selected U.S. destinations.  For shipments to
Wisconsin malt plants, the value of Canadian rail subsidies is sizable.  However, this
advantage is dissipated by higher Canadian handling  costs and the U.S. rail share of the
total movement.  On the right-hand side of the figure, two movements  are shown from
Lethbridge to the California feed market.  The comparison indicates that a prairie-
border-crossing movement by truck costs less than a direct rail movement.
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Opportunities for North American barley trade have inspired  much debate in
Canada.  Recent studies  have reached  sharply different conclusions  about whether the
CWB  has been under-selling barley into the U.S. market, and whether the Board should
retain its monopoly  over Canadian exports.  These  studies are briefly summarized  to
provide background and impetus to our analysis.8
Alberta Agriculture.  This study was one of the first published on the topic and
presented a proposal to liberalize barley trade in North America.  Following are some of
the major points:
1)  The prairie farmer cost/price  squeeze provides impetus to seek new markets
and a different market regime.
2)  Canadian marketing costs have been rising, whereas  those in the United
States have  been declining since the early 1980s.
3)  The Canadian feed grain market is less spatially efficient than that in the
United States.
4)  The CWB total payment for barley at Red  Deer, Alberta,  has averaged
C$27/mt less than the Great Falls price.
5)  Alberta has capacity to sell 1-1.4 mmt of barley into the Northwestern
region of the United States (Magnusson and Lerohl).
Agriculture Canada.  In its regulatory review, Agriculture Canada found that the
single-desk selling of barley was a priority issue requiring attention.  Ultimately, they
reaffirmed that the CWB should remain as the sole exporter of barley to third countries.
However, for North American trade, they recommended  that an intensive analysis be
undertaken.  This eventuated in the Carter report.
Canadian Wheat Board.  In its December  1992 report, the CWB presented a
number of arguments in defense of the existing marketing system:
1)  As a single-desk seller, the CWB continuously reviews all markets to
identify those with the greatest payoff.  Whenever sales into the United
States offer the best net return, sales are made.
2)  Increased sales to the United States would ultimately lower export earnings
in some third countries (e.g., Japan) because prices to those countries  are
7Another study by Haley et al. analyzed  impacts of the EEP program using SWOPSIM,
a static, non-spatial trade model.
8Veeman provides  a useful review  of the controversy surrounding the Continental
Barley Market.
7based on U.S. prices.  Conversely,  by restricting sales to the United States,
total pooled export earnings are supported.
3)  In general, net returns from sales to Japan have been the greatest of all
markets, followed by Saudi Arabia, and then distantly by sales to U.S.
destinations (p. 23).
4)  A continental barley marketing system would have the following impacts:
(a) an increase in exports to the United States and reduction  in the U.S.
barley price; (b) reduction in returns from offshore markets;  (c)  a loss in
malting barley premiums; (d) possible U.S. retaliation; and (e) transhipment
of Canadian barley through the U.S. marketing system.
Carter Report.  An extensive and detailed analysis of the North American barley
market was conducted for the Agriculture  Canada Grains and Oilseeds  Branch.  This was
in response to the earlier Regulatory Review recommendation.
The principal question was "whether barley farmers benefit from monopoly selling
powers vested in the CWB."  This debate during the past few years has centered around
five principal points:  (a) the overall impact of a single continental market for barley
producers;  (b) domestic pricing  efficiency;  (c) why such a large proportion of Prairie barley
area is planted to malting varieties, given the market size  and premium;  (d) the market
potential of U.S. western states for Canadian feed barley;  and (e) impacts of the U.S. EEP
program  on barley flows  and income.
A multifaceted study was initiated to address these questions.  Following are some
of the principal findings  (Carter, p. 2):
1)  The CWB  does not exert market power in either the United States or the
world market.
2)  Sharp inefficiencies within the Canadian marketing system could be
corrected through greater exposure to U.S. competitive pressures.
3)  Significant opportunities  exist for expanded  sales of barley from Canada to
the United States.  If more liberalized trading were allowed, an additional
500,000 mt of feed barley and 400,000 mt of malting barley could be sold
into the United States  Producer  revenues from barley could increase by up
to 17% if a continental market were adopted.
Because of this study, the Minister of Agriculture recommended  liberalizing barley
trading for North America,  beginning with the 1993/94 marketing year.  This included
eliminating import licenses for sales of malt and barley into Canada.
University of Saskatchewan.  Schmitz,  Gray and Ulrich conducted  a concurrent
study on the subject.  They used a world barley trade model with four markets,  and
8various simplifying assumptions  about intermarket price spreads. 9  Results  from that
study indicated that a Continental barley market would increase the equilibrium trade
flow from  620,000 mt to 740,000 mt, with only a slight reduction in producer welfare.
Thus, opening the border would not have a significant impact on revenue from the feed
market; however, the major negative impact would be on malt trade and on malting
barley premiums  of Canadian producers.
2.  North American Barley: Production, Use,  and Trade
Barley Supply
Barley production is concentrated in the midwest  and western  states and in the
western Canadian provinces.  Barley is generally grown in regions that are not suited for
row crops, mainly competing with wheat for acreage.  U.S. barley acres vary from year to
year;  however,  10 states (California,  Colorado, Idaho,  Minnesota, Montana,  North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Washington,  and Wyoming) have accounted  for about 90% of
planted  acres since  1980.  Harvested  acres are shown in Figure 2.1 for the 10 largest
barley-producing  states.
The area planted to barley has declined  significantly since the early  1980s.  This
decrease largely reflects impacts of CRP, (Figure 2.2) which has removed about 2.75
million barley acres from production throughout the United States.  About 23% of the
area planted in 1986 has been set aside under the CRP program; however, the percentage
reduction varies geographically.  This land may be returned  to production beginning in
1996,  staggered in annual increments  corresponding with the 10-year anniversary  of
entries into the program.  Thus, the sharp reduction in U.S. barley area that has occurred
under CRP may be reversed in future years.
Apart from  CRP, other factors have led to reduced barley acreage  in individual
producing states.  Competing crops for barley vary substantially.  In western states, high-
valued competing crops include potatoes,  alfalfa, edible beans,  sugar beets, and some
irrigated vegetables.  Feed barley, which has a significantly  higher yield in these western
states,  also competes  for acreage with malting barley.
In contrast, competing crops in the midwest are largely hard red spring wheat,
durum wheat,  and sunflower.  Increasingly, other row  crops are penetrating the southern
producing areas in North Dakota and displacing barley production.  Feed barley varieties
in this region do not have substantially greater yields and, thus, do not represent an
important cropping alternative  for producers.
9Demand elasticities  (evaluated at mean trade levels) for the U.S. and Canadian
domestic markets were -1.30  and -.70, respectively, while the demand elasticity for
offshore (EEP) markets was -1.20.  The U.S.-Canada price spread was specified  as a linear
function of the bilateral trade volume.  This was based on a freight rate comparison  for
two U.S. destinations (Yakima vs. Central Valley in California),  but did not reflect
detailed analysis of regional demand schedules.
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Figure 2.2.  Total Barley  Base and Yearly Entrance in CRP
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2Acreage in California and Oregon has declined  since the 1960s.  Since  1984,
acreage  has declined  in Colorado, Idaho, Washington, Minnesota, Montana,  and South
Dakota.  In North Dakota,  acreage decreased  by 20% between  1983 and  1992.
Barley production in Canada  is concentrated  primarily in Alberta  and
Saskatchewan  (Figure 2.3).  Through most of the 1980s, area planted to barley was in the
11 to  12 million acre range; however, area planted fell sharply in 1992.  Competing crops
in Canada include spring wheat, durum wheat, and canola.
Yields have increased  slightly since  1960  in the United States and Canada (Figure
2.4).  Comparisons  across states and provinces are shown in Figure 2.5.  The western
states of Colorado,  Idaho, Oregon, and Wyoming are irrigated and, consequently,  have the
greatest yields.  Average midwest yields (except for Minnesota) are lower than in western
states, but are generally comparable.  In Canada,  average yields are lowest in
Saskatchewan.
Barley varieties  are either 6-rowed  or 2-rowed.  They are further divided into
malting or feed varieties  (the distinction is described in the next section).  In recent years,
6-rowed  malting and 2-rowed feed varieties have accounted for the largest and second
largest shares,  respectively, of barley varieties grown in the United States (Figure 2.6).
The proportion  of feed varieties grown has increased slightly since  1989.  Varieties  grown
in Canada  are predominantly  2-rowed  and 6-rowed  malting.  Figure 2.7 shows the
geographical  distribution of 1991  production by type in the United States.  Malting barley
production dominates in the midwest, but is less dominant in western states.  Carter (p.
9)  showed that between  1985  and 1992, the area planted to malting varieties in Western
Canada ranged between  62 and  69%, similar to U.S. levels (Figure 2.6).
Components of U.S. barley supply are  shown in Figure 2.8.  First, imports
(exclusively from Canada) are shown.  Second,  supply has declined noticeably during the
latter 1980s.  Third, government stocks were  depleted in the early  1990s.  And fourth,
the volume of private stocks is abnormally large relative to other grains, and relative to
other countries.  Privately-owned  stocks of 100 million bushels  represent about 2/3 of
annual requirements  for the malting industry, which suggests that brewers carry large
stocks in anticipation  of crop/quality shortages.
Comparable  data for Canada are also shown.  Total supplies  are typically near  15
million mt.  Canadian production  exceeds  U.S. production, but stocks are about equal;
thus, relative  stockholding is greater in the United States.
Barley Use
Barley is used primarily in the malt and livestock feed industries  in both domestic
and export markets.  The North American malting industry is discussed in the next
section after feed  and export demand.  A comparison of the composition  of barley demand
is shown in Figure 2.9, using averages for two periods.
Barley use for beer (and, therefore, malting) is greater in the United States than
in Canada.  Feed use is of greater relative importance  in Canada, since barley is the
primary feed grain in western Canada.  Canada  also exports  a greater  amount of barley
than the United States.
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2.9.  Components of Barley Demand, U.S. and Canada (Average 1985-88 and  1989-92)
Feed Demand
Barley is a good source of energy and nutrients for many animal groups.10  In the
United States, feed accounts  for the greatest use of barley,  followed  closely by beer and
alcohol use.  Barley used as feed is reported  as a residual in USDA estimates.  Variability
of feed use is greater than variability  of other domestic uses.
Johnson and Varghese developed  a model to analyze regional demand for feed
barley.  Their analysis was based on a linear programming approach to least-cost feed
formulation.  Nutritional requirements for 5 livestock classes (beef, dairy, swine, poultry,
and sheep) and 37 individual animal diets were incorporated  into the model.  By varying
the barley price while holding other ingredient prices fixed, barley demand schedules were
derived for each livestock category.  These were weighted  together, using published
livestock inventory data, to yield regional demand schedules.
Barley feeding varies substantially across regions due to the size and composition
of livestock herds and the price of barley relative to alternative  feed ingredients.  Barley
1o"Competition among feed ingredients  depends primarily on relative price and relative
energy value.  The percentage of metabolizable energy in barley is slightly less than corn
and sorghum  averaged  across all livestock classes.  Barley is equivalent to corn in terms
of feeding value when fed to ruminants  like dairy and beef cattle and  sheep.  Barley's
high fiber content makes it less palatable and digestible to young  swine and poultry" (Ash
and Hoffman, p. 4).
15is a principal feed ingredient in western Canada due to its availability  and the high
freight costs for competing  feed ingredients.  In the United States, regions east of the
barley-producing  regions are largely surplus corn-producing  states; barley is generally  not
competitive  in those regions.  Barley feeding is more competitive in the western United
States where the costs of alternative  feed grains (primarily corn) are high.
Barley Exports
Barley exports from the United States have been erratic since  1960 (Figure 2.10),
though increases  occurred during the late 1980s.  EC-12 was the largest purchaser of
barley from the United States in the 1960s;  however, its purchases  have virtually ceased.
Saudi Arabia  started to buy barley in the late 1970s and accounted for most of the barley
exported  from the United States during the 1980s.
A comparison of U.S. and Canadian exports  to primary destinations  for the
1991/92 marketing year is shown in Figure 2.11.  Canada dominates in each of the
markets except for Saudi Arabia.  Figure 2.12 shows barley quantities under the EEP
program  since 1986.  These have ranged from  a high of nearly 3.5 mmt to a low of less
than  1.0 mmt in 1989.  Saudi Arabia has been the major recipient of EEP for barley.
Average bonuses over this period were $32/mt, but ranged from $18/mt in 1989 to $41/mt
in 1991  (Figure 2.13).
Exports  of barley are primarily for non-malting purposes.  Malting barley has
ranged from  0.16% to 8.55% of total barley exported  from the United States (Figure 2.14).
Since 1988, Israel, Japan, and Mexico have accounted  for most of these malting barley
exports.  Exports of malting barley from Canada  are greater and have increased since
1989 (Figure 2.15).  A major component of that increase has been exports of malting
barley to the United  States and China.
3.  Malting Barley Production
Barley is classed into feed or malting varieties.  In the United States, malting
varieties are those that the American Malting Barley Association,  Inc.  (AMBA) has
recommended  for malting in specific states.  Producers plant malting varieties in hopes of
meeting malting quality standards  (e.g., for plumpness and protein).  If barley is of an
approved variety, but fails to meet malting standards, it is  sold as feed barley."
'The  Federal Grain Inspection Services (FGIS) is the agency that establishes
standards and factor limits for barley.  These grade standards follow the conventional
"least factor  approach" as is used in many countries  and for other grains.  To be classed as
a malting barley, the variety must be recommended  by AMBA.  In addition, there are
numerous non-grade  determining factors which have an important impact on quality.
Values of nongrade factors are specified in contracts, and premiums  or discounts may
apply; thus, they are important for handlers in making binning/blending decisions.  Of
particular  importance for malting barley are plumpness, protein, germination,  and
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Figure 2.10. U.S. Barley Exports.
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- - -Breeding programs,  agronomic practices, soil characteristics,  and climatic
conditions  determine varietal types of barley grown in each state.  Production estimates
by type of barley were derived at the state level and are shown in Figure 3.1 for 9 major
producing  states.  Individual  barley varieties were classified as feed or malting, 2-rowed
or 6-rowed.  The fraction of acreage planted to these individual barley varieties was
multiplied  by production  in that state.
Minnesota, North Dakota, and  South Dakota grow primarily 6-rowed  malting
varieties.  Since  1976, acres  planted to 6-rowed  feed varieties have been  decreasing, while
acres planted to 2-rowed  feed varieties have been increasing in the Dakotas.  Minnesota
grows  6-rowed malting varieties almost exclusively.
Both feed and malting varieties are grown in Colorado and Idaho in significant
amounts.  The share of barley planted to 2-rowed  malting varieties in Colorado has
increased relative to feed varieties.  In Idaho, the share of 6-rowed malting varieties has
grown due to increased contracting with maltsters during the late  1980s.
Montana and Wyoming mainly produce 2-rowed varieties.  Most of the acres in
Montana  are planted to 2-rowed feed varieties, while 2-rowed  malting varieties dominate
in Wyoming.  The coastal states of California,  Oregon, and Washington produce  mainly 6-
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Figure 3.1.  U.S.  Barley Production by Type:  Across  State (4-Year Average 1989-92)
20Malting varieties are grown predominantly in the Midwest states (Figure 3.1),
with 6-rowed  malting varieties accounting for approximately  55% of the acres grown and
2-rowed malting varieties  accounting for approximately  12%  (Figure 3.2) in 1992.  Area
planted to 6-rowed malting varieties has increased more than have areas for 2-rowed
malting and feed varieties.
Important institutional differences  affect quality regulations in the United States
and Canada.  In the United States, the AMBA approves varieties for malting by state.
Other varieties are classified as barley and are produced and sold for non-malting use.  In
the United States, both 6-rowed and 2-rowed malting varieties are white aleurone.
The variety approval process differs in Canada.  Of particular importance is that
varieties  not approved for malting may still be produced,  but only under contract  (or for
feeding purposes).  Traditionally,  all varieties approved  for malting in Canada have been
either 2-rowed white aleurone or 6-rowed  blue aleurone.  Other 6-rowed white aleurone
varieties  are grown under contract.12
The area planted to malting varieties indicates the proportion that is potentially
available  for malting.  The proportion of the crop that is graded to be of malting quality,
or sold for malting, is smaller.  To put this in perspective,  data were compiled on barley
grade factors.  Barley samples are collected annually in some states for quality evaluation.
Some of those analyses estimate the proportion of crop grading as malting barley  or as
No. 3 or better malting barley.1 3  State averages of these figures for the 5 principal
producing states are shown in Figure 3.3.  These figures vary substantially  through time
(Figure 3.2).
Minnesota  and North Dakota malting barley typically grades No.  3 or better 60%
of the time, and the South Dakota average is about 50%.  Malting barley in Montana
grades  No. 3 or better about 30% of the time.  Malting quality in Idaho is substantially
greater than in the Midwest, reflecting the more controlled  growing environment.
These figures were combined with other production  data to derive estimates  of
malting barley production (grading No.  3 or better) for each of these states.  Estimates
were derived  from the product of acres  harvested, yield (including a lower yield for
malting barley in Idaho), the percent of acres planted to malting varieties, and the
percent of production grading No.  3 or better malting (from Figure 3.2).  As illustrated,
North Dakota is the largest malting barley- producing state, with production of nearly 100
million bushels.  Minnesota  and Idaho each produce  between 20 and 40 million bushels,
and Montana and South Dakota each produce less than 10 million bushels.
Components of these figures are shown in Table 3.1, using averages for  1990-1992.
Estimates were not publicly available for Colorado, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and
Wyoming.  Figures used for these states were taken from discussions with industry
participants.  State production estimates were derived for malting barley, either grading
No.  3 or better or sold  as malting barley (depending on the reporting system).
12Carter (p. 9-10) documents the percent of barley sold for malting (p.  10) and
discusses factors affecting variety planting decisions.









Figure 3.2.  Production  of Malting Barley Grading  No.  3 or Better: By State
North Dakota I MinnesotaL  South Dakota 3 Montana  4
Figure  3.3.
By State
1 North Dakota,  1987 to 1992 average.
2 Minnesota, 1987 to  1992 average.
3 South Dakota, 1987 to 1992 average.
4 Montana,  1989 to 1991  average.
5 Idaho,  1989 to  1992 average.
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*1 tTABLE  3.1.  U.S.  PRODUCTION  ESTIMATES  OF  MALTING  BARLEY
Harvest  Yield  State  Production
Acres  Malting  6-rowed  2-rowed  Grade  3  (000  bu)
State  (000)  bu/acre  %  %  %  6-rowed  2-rowed
CO  133.3  78  7  63  90  655  5,933
ID  763.3  74  26  21  91  13,247  10,988
MN  783.3  63  96  0  69  32,810  0
MT  1,410.0  46  4  34  80  2,076  17,382
ND  2,643.3  54  80  0  65  74,823  0
OR  151.6  68  4  2  80  346  132
SD  446.7  46  62  0  53  6,760  0
WA  466.7  56  2  9  90  447  2,140
WY  133.3  78  0  68  90  0  6,357
---------- average------------
9-State
Total  6,932  63  31  22  79  131,163  42,933
For comparison,  U.S. malt demand is about 104 and 40 million bushels for 6- and
2-rowed, respectively.  Generally,  the United States produces a large surplus of 6-rowed
malting varieties grading No. 3 or better.  In contrast, 2-rowed varieties are in relatively
short supply.  On average, production of 6-rowed malting barley is adequate,  though
periodic shortages of sufficient quality may occur due to weather vagaries.  There is a
greater chance of this occurring for 2-rowed malting barley than for 6-rowed malting
barley.  The relatively low level of 2-rowed malting barley suggests that this would be the
type most likely imported.
4.  U.S. Malt Demand and Utilization"
This section provides  a description of the U.S. beer industry in the United States
with particular focus  on issues relating to malt consumption.  Structural characteristics  of
the beer industry are presented, and malt utilization in the U.S. beer industry is
analyzed.
Structural Characteristics of the U.S.  Beer Industry
A few large firms dominate the U.S. beer industry.  Sales of the largest 20 brewery
firms in the United States are shown in Figure 4.1.  Anheuser-Busch  is the largest with
14The Canadian beer and malting industry is discussed in Carter (pp. 13-14).
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4.1.  Market Share and Capacity of the Largest Brewing Companies:  1991
nearly twice the sales volume of the next largest firm, Miller.  Table 4.1 provides a
description of the structural characteristics  of this industry in recent years.  The number
of beer companies has increased,1" following many years of decline.  This largely reflects
the emergence of micro-breweries, a major trend in this industry.  However,  micro-
breweries remain a small market segment (in comparison to the largest 20 breweries)  in
terms of sales and malt utilization.
Two important structural measures of this industry are shown in Table 4.1.  First
is the 4-firm market share, a standard measure of concentration.  This has increased  in
the past 10 years from  64% to 87% of sales.  However, the Herfindahl index is a more
revealing measure of potential market power since it reflects the market share
distribution.  When there are few, similarly sized firms in an industry, competitive  forces
are greater than when there are few firms of disparate size; the Herfindahl index captures
this effect.16  During the past 10 years, the Herfindahl index has increased from 1,617 to
2,818,  reflecting an increase in the concentration of market power.
"SThe data reported in Table 4.1 are firm data, not plant data.  Many of the largest
firms shown in Figure 4.1 are multiplant brewers.
n
6The Herfindahl index is derived  as  H  =  S?  *  10,000  where S, is the market
1
share of firm i.  H ranges  from 0, reflecting  a perfectly competitive market, to 10,000,
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OLOLU·TABLE  4.1.  STRUCTURAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE
UI.S.  BREWING  INDUSTRY
1981  1990  1991
Number  of  Beer  Companies  142  169
Sales  (mill barrels)  190  189
Average  1.34  1.12
Minimum  (barrels)  166  77
Maximum  (mill barrels)  86.5  86
Structural
Characteristics
4-Firm  Market  Share  %  64  86  87
Herfindahl  Index  1,617  2,807  2,818
SOURCE:  Derived  from  data  in  Modern  Brewery  Age.
Malt Utilization
Beer consumption grew rapidly in the United States through the 1970s.  During
that period, beer production increased at about 4.6% annually.  However, beer production
has stabilized since  1980, while per capita consumption has decreased  (Figure 4.2).
Reasons  for the decrease  include changing population demographics, drunken driving
laws, and increasing health consciousness. 17
Malt utilized in beer production and use of other principal  adjuncts are shown in
Figure 4.3.  The growth rate of malt utilization in the U.S. beer industry has slowed, as
has that for corn.  Utilization of rice has increased.  Estimated growth rates evaluated  at
1991 for these three ingredients are Malt, -.02% per year; corn, -.09% per year; and rice,
+3%  per year.18  Thus, negligible growth in beer production and reduced utilization  of
malt have resulted  in a declining domestic malt market.
The reduced utilization rates of both malt and corn in U.S. beer production  and
increased  use of rice are attributable  to many factors, including  1) increased production
and consumption  of light beers, and 2) greater extraction rates from malt produced with
new varieties.  Malt comprised about 69% of ingredients in 1991.  In Canada this figure is
about 85%, implying utilization of 15% non-malt adjuncts.
'7Similar trends have occurred  in Canada.  See the annual reports of the Brewers
Association of Canada for a graphical depiction.
18Derived from regression of total utilization of each ingredient in beer production from
1964 to 1991, using a regression model of the following general form:  U=a +~,T+p2T 2 +2 3T3
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0Technical changes have encouraged  ingredient  substitution in beer production.
These were estimated  using a basic elasticity of substitution model, with trend term."
Estimated trend coefficients were -.03 and +.026 for malt/rice and malt/corn, respectively.
Each coefficient was significant, and R2s were  .84 and  .87,  respectively.  Trend coefficients
measure changes in input utilization ratios through time.  Malt utilization is decreasing
relative to rice, but is increasing relative to corn.
Regional Estimates of Malt Demand
Beer production  is geographically dispersed,  but is generally concentrated  near
consumption regions.  The geographical  dispersion of production is shown in Figure 4.4.
Some states are aggregated  for disclosure reasons.  The largest states (regions) for beer
production and malt demand in 1991 were Arizona-Missouri-Idaho  (reported as a single
region), followed  by Texas, California, and Georgia-Kentucky-West  Virginia.
Million
4.4.  Beer Production  by State and Province,  1991
19To evaluate substitutability among these ingredients in beer production,  a basic
elasticity of substitution model  was estimated, using these prices and utilization levels.
The model was specified as: log(UUi)=a,+Pi[log(P/Pi)]+Pt[logT]  where U and P are
utilization and price, respectively,  m is for malt and i is for other inputs and T is a time
trend.  In this basic model, Pi is the elasticity of substitution, measuring the response of
input ratios  to changes  in relative prices.
27
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255.  U.S. Malting Industry
Structural Characteristics
The distribution of estimated capacities  for the U.S. malting industry is shown in
Figure 5.1.  The industry is dominated by a few large privately held firms; however, their
size differences  are not as great as in the beer industry.  Ladish has always  been the
largest maltster, followed in recent years by Anheuser-Busch,  Fleischman-Kurth  (a
division of ADM),  Great Western  and Froedtert.  Others are small, typically operating
single-plant units.20
Structural characteristics  of the North American  industry are shown in Table 5.1.
Industry capacity increased rapidly during the 1970s, generally coinciding with increases
in malt demand  by the beer industry.  However,  growth in capacity was minimal during
the 1980s.  The largest 4 firms control about 59% of capacity,  up from about 37% in 1968.
Brewer-controlled  capacity has also increased  from  16% in 1968 to about 27% in 1992.
The Herfindahl index rose from 687 in 1968 to 1208 in 1990,  indicating increased
concentration in the malting industry.  However, the largest firms in the industry are of
similar size, which intensifies competition in sales and procurement.
For comparison, the Herfindahl  index calculated for Canada is 4010.  If the malt
industry is viewed within a combined  North American  geographical market, structural
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5.1.  Malt Industry:  Firm  Capacity and Market Share
20Detailed information of individual plants is shown in Canadian Wheat Board, p. 56.
The data used here differs only slightly.  The CWB data show an industry capacity in
1992 of 174 million bushels malt, whereas it is more readily accepted that the U.S
industry is about 186 million bushels.  The latter figures are used here.
28TABLE  5.1.  STRUCTURAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  NORTH
AMERICAN  MALTING  INDUSTRY
1968  1980  1992  1992
United  United  United  1992  North
Item  States  States  States  Canada  America
Number  of  Plants  na  37  23  6  29
Number  of  Firms  31  26  13  4  16
Industry  Capacity
(million bu malt)  96  178  186  39  225
Structural Characteristics
Brewer  Controlled  16%  20%  27%  59%  43%
4-Firm  Market  Share  37%  51%  59%  100%  60%
Herfindahl  Index  687  1,009  1,208  4,010  1,178
Malting Capacity by State/Region
The geographic  distribution of malt plants is illustrated in Figure 5.2 with
comparisons to malt demand by breweries.  Historically,  the industry developed in
Wisconsin and Minnesota, and these states still dominate the industry.  In the early
1970s, Ladish expanded with a new plant in North Dakota.  Other new capacity in recent
years has been added in Idaho to capture the expected growth in west coast demand for
beer and barley production in those states.
Firm Strategies
The U.S. malting industry is relatively concentrated.  However, demand is
stagnant, and excess capacity exists.  At least 4 elements  of broader firm strategies are
apparent:
Globalization.  The U.S.  industry has been dominated by large single-plant private
firms.  However, over the past decade numerous changes generally have reflected a more
global industry.
Cargill entered into a joint venture with Ladish in 1991.  This represents  Cargill's
first entry into the U.S.  malting industry, though it remains the largest maltster company
in France and the world.  Froedtert, previously owned by Harvest States Cooperative, was
sold to a consortium of firms, who eventually  sold to a large French malting firm.
At least 3 significant changes have occurred within North America in the past few
years:  1)  Great West Malting Company, previously a subsidiary of Univar, was acquired
by Canada Malting, the largest malt company in Canada, making Canada Malting the
largest malt firm in North America;  2) Schrier purchased  51% of Prairie Malt  (along with
42% by Saskatchewan  Wheat Pool and 7%  by employees) in September  1989;  3) ADM,
29pacity
5.2.  U.S. Malt Plant Supply and Demand
which owns Fleischman Kurth, the second largest non-integrated maltster in the United
States, bought 65% of Dominion Malt in September  199021; and 4) Rahr has entered into
a joint venture to build a new plant in Alix, Alberta.
Vertical Coordination.  Before the early 1970s, brewery firms were not extensively
integrated into malting in the United States.  However, beginning with the expansion of
Anheuser-Busch  into malting in the early  1970s, interfirm rivalry has intensified.
Anheuser-Busch  and Coors are extensively integrated into malting.  Other brewers have
malt plants  (e.g., Miller, Genesea, Stroh), but on a lesser scale.  In 1992, 28% of the
capacity in the United States was owned and operated  by brewery firms, up from  about
16%  in 1970.  In addition, a common practice is for brewers to enter into "toll-malting"
arrangements.22
Some brewers are also actively involved in the country elevator business, farmer
contracting and variety development.  Anheuser-Busch  began integrating into the country
elevator business in 1983.  All brewers are involved in variety development  through their
industry associations.  However, Anheuser-Busch and Coors each have seed companies  to
develop varieties, and to clean and distribute seed to growers under contract.
Procurement Strategies.  An important element of strategy is barley procurement.
Two of the top three brewers have been actively involved in contracting programs.
Anheuser-Busch  has been involved in breeding programs since the early 1970s.  Coors
develops its own varieties  and has contracted  with producers  for virtually all of its needs.
21A minor share is held by a Japanese group.
22Brewers  supply maltsters with barley and the maltsters collect a toll for processing
services.  This gives brewers complete control over barley selection.
30
PUN 710However,  Coors has recently announced cutting its contracting program,  and Anheuser
Busch has changed its  approach to contracting.
Exports.  Until recently, the United States has not been an active exporter of malt.
However, the U.S. malting industry is pushing to expand exports with assistance from the
Export Enhancement Program  (see below).
Industry Capacity Utilization Rates
Table 5.2 shows elements  of supply and demand for capacity in the U.S. domestic
malt industry23 with comparisons  to Canada. 24  These are also shown in Figure 5.3.
Imports  and exports are minimal, though exports have grown rapidly in the past several
years.  Exports comprised only about 5%  of 1992 malt production in the United States,
compared to 41% in Canada.  Capacity utilization in the U.S. industry is about 81%,  down
sharply from the late  1960s.
Important points demonstrated  in this table are  1) there is a greater use per
barrel in Canada; 2) exports  comprise a greater share of production in Canada than in the
United States; and  3) capacity utilization is somewhat greater in Canada than in the
United States.
U.S. Malt Trade
The United States has routinely imported malt since the mid-1940s.  In some
years, imports were as great as 60,000 mt.  However, malt imports  have been declining
since the early 1980s  (Figure 5.4).  Virtually all malt imports are from  Canada.  The
United States has also been an exporter of malt since the 1940s.  However, the volume
decreased from about  100,000 mt per year in the late  1940s, to less than 20,000 mt in the
late 1970s.  Since then, malt exports have expanded rapidly, nearly tripling during the
1980s.
Principal destinations for malt exports are shown in Figure  5.5.  The largest
markets in recent years  are Mexico, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Philippines.
Numerous other small markets exist, primarily in the Caribbean and South America.
2 3Industry estimates vary but generally  suggest that Coors requires  100% 2-Rowed,
while Anheuser-Busch  utilizes about 70% 6-Rowed,  and 30% 2-Rowed.  Miller utilizes up
to 20% 2-Rowed  and other brewes utilize virtually all 6-Rowed malts.  Combining these
figures with industry sales indicate that U.S. demand for 2-Rowed malt is about 40
million bushels.
24Some Canadian plants reportedly are in the process of expanding due to anticipated
exports to Asia and Japan and/or to increase  efficiency.
31TABLE 5.2. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS:  U.S.  AND CANADIAN MALTING
United States  Canada  N.Am
Units  1968  1980  1992  1992  1991
Malt Beverage
Production  mill brl  117  188  203  17  220
Use Per Barrel  lb/brl  28.2  26.7  24.0  39.5
Domestic Malt Used  mill bu  97  148  144  19.5  164
Malt Export  000 mt  36  39  122  205
Malt  Import  000 mt  36  45  18
% Production Exported
2  2  5  41
Total Malt Production  mill bu  183
malt  97  148  150  32.8
Total Capacity  mill bu  225
malt  96.05  178  186  39
Capacity Utilization  1.00  0.83  0.81  0.84
SOURCES: Derived from data c
Commodity Trade Statistics,
Grains Council  Statistical
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5.5.  U.S. Malt Exports
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VChina is a major importer and potential growth market for malt and/or malting
barley.  However, as is true for many malt importers, China has a strong preference  for 2-
rowed varieties.25  U.S. maltsters have been working with some Chinese brewers.  In
general, these brewers  are "impressed and comfortable" with U.S. 2-rowed barley,
although they "still have some concerns  about 6-rowed  barley (primarily the fear of higher
protein levels)" (Barley Bulletin, December  1992).
Malt has been targeted in numerous  EEP initiatives,  beginning in 1986.  Since
then, nearly 300,000 mt of malt have been sold through this program.  The Targeted
Export Assistance  (TEA) program has also been used to promote U.S. malt exports.
Sample shipments are sent to buyers, primarily in Latin America, to familiarize them
with U.S. malt varieties.
A summary of the use of EEP in the U.S.  barley sector is shown in Table 5.3.  All
figures  are for the crop years from 1985/86  through 1991/92.  Barley sales under EEP
during this period were 11.4 mmt, compared to 257,000 mt of malt.  Barley sales under
EEP have a greater chance of being consummated relative to those of malt, with 78% for
barley versus 33% for malt.26  The average bonus  on malt is nearly 3 times as great as
that for barley.  Barley sales ranged  from 397,000 mt in 1985/86 to a high of 2.9  mmt
both in 1986/87  and  1987/88.  Malt exports increased  from 43,919 mt in 1985 to 122,244
mt in 1991.  From  1985/86  to 1991/92,  percentages of U.S.  exports sold under EEP have
been 84% and 41%,  respectively, for barley and malt (Table 5.3).
TABLE  5.3.  SUMMARY  OF  EEP  IN  U.S.  BARLEY
SECTOR  (1985/86  TO  1991/92)
Barley  Malt
Initiatives  (000  mt)  14,650  780
Sales  Under  EEP  (000  mt)  11,436  257
Sales  of  Initiatives  (%)  78  33
Total  Exports  (1985/86  to
1991/92)  (000  mt)  13,586  625
Sold  Under  EEP  (%)  84  41
EEP  Bonus  Weighted  Average  $32  $97
($/mt)
Derived  from  USDA  data  sources.
In October  1992, breaking convention,  Colombia (50,000 mt) and Turkey (100,000
mt) were targeted  specifically for "malting barley"; however,  no sales were consummated.
Targeted countries  for barley include Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan,  Malta, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland,  Tunisia, Turkey,
and FSU.  Targeted  countries for malt include Algeria, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon,
25This is due to tradition.  Europe dominates the world malt market and has trained
brewers to use its 2-rowed varieties.
26For malt, the sum of initiatives include those that were canceled as well as those
that did not result in transactions.
34Philippines, and Venezuela.  Important non-EEP customers  include Denmark, the United
Kingdom,  and Japan.
6.  Overview  of the Spatial Equilibrium Model
A mathematical programming  model was developed to analyze North American
barley flows.  The United States and Canada are divided into different producing and
consuming regions; to these are added several export markets for barley and malt.  The
objective is to maximize the sum of producer and consumer surplus in feed barley markets
less the cost of satisfying fixed regional  demands for malt.  This formulation treats malt
demand as completely inelastic, while allowing feed barley prices  and quantities fed (by
region) to vary.  By design, conditions of competitive spatial equilibrium  are satisfied in
the model solution.27
The model analyzes barley flows within a marketing year and with fixed supplies.
For each barley-producing region, available supplies  are based on average annual
production (acres times yield).  The model does not incorporate storage activities;  all
barley demand is  for current use, either for feed or production of malt.  Equivalently,  we
assume no net change in stocks (and no spatial redistribution of stocks) during the
marketing year.
Figure 6.1 provides  a description of the disposition of barley and malt in the
model.  Barley is shipped from producing regions to feed demand regions, including export
markets.  Malting barley is shipped to malt plants where,  subject to capacity constraints,
it is converted  into malt for reshipment to malt demand regions  (i.e.,  North American
breweries  and offshore malt markets).
Barley Supplies
There are 30 barley supply regions, including 23 in the United States and  7 in
Canada.  Supply regions are identified  with crop reporting districts in selected states (the
Dakotas and Minnesota).  Montana is divided into eastern and western sections, while
other Western  states are left whole.  Manitoba and Saskatchewan  are divided into
southern and northern  sections, while Alberta is divided into southern, central, and
northern sections.  This permits  refinement of north/south shipping costs, an important
determinant of trade flows in model simulations.
Barley supplies include four distinct types: feed barley (varieties not suitable for
malting),  6-rowed white malting, 6-rowed  blue malting, and 2-rowed malting.  For each
producing region, supplies are divided  among the four types, based on (a) average acres
planted to individual varieties and (b) an assumed yield differential between feed  and
malting varieties.  In base-case simulations, the yield for feed varieties is assumed to be
10% higher yield than for malting varieties.




6.1.  Barley and Malt Flows in the Model
Malting barley supplies also reflect adjustments for crop quality.  For U.S.
producing regions,  the availability of malting barley is adjusted to reflect average crop
quality, as indicated  by state-level quality data.  In North Dakota, for example,  67 percent
of the production of malting varieties  is assumed to be of "malting quality."  That is the
average percentage  of North Dakota samples graded  as U.S.  No. 3 or better, based on
annual crop quality surveys from  1987-91.  Different  percentages  apply to other producing
states.
Quality adjustments for Canada take into account the regional pattern of malting
barley deliveries  during 1987-91.2"  Because historical selection rates understate the true
amount of malting-quality barley in Canada, we use modified  rates.  The modifications
ensure that 2.5 million metric tons of Canadian barley are available for malting.29
2 See Carter, p.  10, for malting deliveries relative to total deliveries  by Canadian crop
district.
2Let si represent the historical acceptance rate (percentage) for Canadian region i, and
let Mi  represent the quantity of malting type j produced  in region i.  The adjusted rate, fi,
is given by fi  =  si + 6(90 - si), where  0<0<1 and
EE  .M  = 2.5 million mt
i  i
For practical  purposes, 90 percent  is the maximum  acceptance rate.  Adjustments in each
region are proportional to (90  -si); hence, they are larger, in percentage terms,  for regions
where historical  selection rates have been low.  However, traditional  supply regions
(where si values are high) retain a quality advantage.
36For each region, supplies of malting barley are calculated as follows.  Let My
denote the supply in region i of malting type j (6-rowed  white, 6-rowed  blue, or 2-row).
Let Ai denote the total planted acreage in region i; Vi,  the fraction of acres planted to
malting type j;  Y 1, the average (planted) yield; and  Gi, the fraction of production that
grades  as malting.  Regional supplies  are given by
M,  = Ai  ViiV,  Yi  Gi
The supply of feed barley is calculated  as a residual:  total barley production in a region
less malting barley.  Regional supply parameters  are shown in Table 6.1.
Quality differences in supply are important because demand requirements vary
across brewers.  The four types of barley are assumed to be perfectly substitutable in feed
demand. The model allows malting barley to be sold for feed;  supplies of feed barley,
however, have no alternative use.  Figure 6.2 shows aggregate  barley supplies by type for
the United States  and Canada under base-case  assumptions.
Regional  Feed Demand
There are 21 feed demand regions  in the model, including 13 in the United States,
6 in Canada, and 2 export markets.  The North American regions are states (western and
midwestern) and provinces  with significant feed demand.
Data on feed use are not published on a regional or state level.30  Consequently,
it was not possible to estimate regional demand functions using econometric techniques.
State and province-level  demand functions for feed barley were synthesized  from an
optimization model.  Specifically,  we used the regional least-cost feed model developed by
Johnson and Varghese.  That model combines diet formulations  for several classes  of
livestock in a single linear-programming problem.  Using  1992 livestock inventories as
scaling factors, the LP model was adapted for  13 individual states and 6 provinces.  Prices
of substitute feeds were those observed in each region in April, 1993.31  Synthetic
demand schedules were derived by varying the price of barley incrementally,  holding
other prices constant.  Demand  schedules were linearized for insertion into the spatial
model.
Results of this analysis are shown in Table 6.2.  Demand schedules for selected
regions are also compared  in Figure 6.3.  A quantity limit is established for each region,
corresponding to estimated total consumption of feed grains.  By this criterion, California
holds the largest potential  as a market for feed barley.  California is also a high-priced
barley market, owing to costs of substitute feed grains.  States in the Pacific Northwest
30Barley feed use is only estimated on a national  basis--and then only indirectly, based
on current production, stock levels, trade, and food and industrial (malting) uses.
3'Canadian  prices were converted at an exchange rate of US $.79 per Canadian dollar.
37TABLE  6.1.  SUPPLY  PARAMETERS  FOR  SPATIAL  EQUILIBRIUM  MODEL
Supply  Region  Basing  Point  Total  Malting  Distribution  of  Malting  Acres  %  Average
for  Calculation  Acres,  Acres  as  by  Type,  %  Graded  Yield
of  Freight  '000  % of  as  for
Costs  Total  2-Rowed  6-Rowed  6-Rowed  Malting  All
Acres  Malting  White  Blue  t  Barley,













































































































































































0TABLE  6.1.  (CONTINUED)
Supply  Region  Basing  Point  Total  Malting  Distribution  of  Malting  Acres  %  Average
for  Calculation  Acres,  Acres  as  by  Type,  %  Graded  Yield
of  Freight  '000  % of  as  for
Costs  Total  2-Rowed  6-Rowed  6-Rowed  Malting  All
Acres  Malting  White  Blue  t  Barley,
Malting  Malting  bu/a
- Continued  -
South Dakota, CRD-2  Selby  162  68  0
South Dakota, CRD-3  Bristol  118  87  0
South Dakota, Other  Wosley  188  45  0
Utah  Salt  Lake City  111  52  82
Washington  Spokane  490  9  78
Wyoming  Powell  123  67  100
Canadian  Supply  Regions
Co
CW  Central Alberta  Edmonton  2,117  49  70
Northern Alberta  Grande Prairie  1,152  37  62
Southern Alberta  Lethbridge  1,752  63  93
Northern Manitoba  Winnipeg  454  43  18
Southern Manitoba  Kilarny  936  53  12
Northern Saskatchewan  Saskatoon  2,720  87  74
Southern Saskatchewan  Weyburn  562  84  81
t  For U.S. regions, percent of malting variety production grading as No. 3

































































6.2.  Barley Production  by Type, U.S. and Canada, Base-case Assumptions
also have high-priced  barley markets relative to those in the Midwest.  Among Prairie
provinces,  Alberta is the largest potential market for feed barley,  followed  by
Saskatchewan.
None of the other studies on North American barley explicitly model regional
demands (as distinct from total feed grain use),  so it is not possible to compare our
regional  demand elasticities with those of other studies.  However, the finding that
regional demand schedules  for barley are highly price elastic is consistent with
expectations,  given the availability of corn and other substitutes for barley in livestock
rations. 32
An important institutional relationship exists in some Prairie provinces.  In
particular, Alberta has subsidized  local barley feeding under the Crow Benefit Offset
Program. In Saskatchewan,  the Feed Grain  Market Adjustment Program  is used to the
offset the competitive disadvantage  of Saskatchewan  livestock producers vis-a-vis  other
provinces.  For model simulations, we capture the effects of these programs through
assumptions  on transport and handling costs  for intra-provincial  barley flows.33
32The Carter report also supports the view that U.S.  markets are highly elastic.  The
price elasticity of U.S. demand for Canadian  barley was estimated  at -19  (p. 59).
33Specifically, we reduce the transportation and handling costs for intraprovincial flows
in Alberta and Saskatchewan  by U.S. $7.9/mt.  This adjustment  encourages  feed use
within those provinces in the base case.  In alternative model  simulations, when





1 v^TABLE  6.2.  DEMAND  PARAMETERS  FOR  REGIONAL  FEED  BARLEY  MARKETS
Max.  Barley  Price
State  or  Quantity  Elasticity
Province  Constant  t  Slope  t  ('000  mt)  of  Demand  t
Arizona  119.2  -. 02515  676  -13.0
California  128.5  -. 00391  6,453  -9.2
Colorado  98.9  -. 00684  2,686  -9.7
Idaho  114.7  -. 03726  1,351  -3.6
Minnesota  82.4  -. 00318  5,500  -8.4
Montana  108.1  -. 04919  962  -3.6
North  Dakota  81.5  -. 03983  1,100  -2.7
Nevada  128.7  -. 15724  350  -3.7
Oregon  122.1  -. 02352  973  -9.7
South  Dakota  86.3  -. 00622  2,500  -10.1
Utah  110.4  -. 02911  550  -12.8
Washington  124.4  -. 04502  1,434  -2.9
Wyoming  99.4  -. 07780  543  -3.7
Alberta  86.9  -. 00804  4,000  -4.4
B.  Columbia  99.7  -. 06357  500  -5.3
Manitoba  70.2  -. 01376  1,000  -9.2
Ontario  82.0  -. 00984  2,000  -6.6
Quebec  87.6  -. 00833  1,600  -12.1
Saskatchewan  73.1  -. 01257  2,000  -4.8
t Parameters  from  regression  equation:  P  =  a  +  p-Q  where  P  is  the
feed  barley  price  and  Q  is  demand  quantity  (derived  from  regional
feed  model).
*  Estimated  total  consumption  of  feed  grains  (Carter  report  and
authors'  estimates).
t  Evaluated  at  midpoints  of  derived  demand  schedules.
Export Demand
The two export markets represent aggregates  of two groups of countries: those
that receive  U.S.  export subsidies under the EEP program ("subsidized" markets) and
those that do not ("nonsubsidized" markets).  All  exports are assumed  to be made through
the Pacific ports, Portland and Vancouver.34
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6.3.  Feed Demand  in Selected Regions
For the subsidized market, we estimated a single demand equation for North
American barley exports.  Annual data from  1973-91 were used to estimate the following
regression (t-statistics in parentheses):
ABP =  15.29 + .9021 PC  - .0129 QX  Adj.  R-sq:  .902
(.947)  (6.651)  (-5.959)  DW: 1.796
where ABP is the adjusted barley price (Portland price, adjusted for average  EEP bonus
in 1986-91),  PC is the export corn price (Gulf ports), and QX is the volume of North
American barley exports ('000 metric tons) to countries that received EEP subsidies
during 1986-91.
This equation yielded an estimated price elasticity of demand of -3.1,  evaluated at
mean prices and trade volumes for the period when EEP was used.  We were unable to
obtain satisfactory  statistical results for the nonsubsidized market;  for simplicity, we use
Carter's elasticity (-1.9) for Canadian exports to Japan.  Trade volumes used  to construct
offshore demand parameters  are shown in Table 6.3.
The model reflects several features  of the current policy regime affecting exports.
EEP bonuses ($32 per metric  ton under the base case) apply to all U.S. shipments to the
subsidized export market.35  Export prices, measured at Pacific ports, reflect the EEP
5The model  does not allow Canadian barley to earn the EEP subsidy after




.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.. . .. ..
............. --------------------------------------------------  ----------------------------------------------------
--------  ------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --  . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  .-
i----------------
- - - - - - - - -TABLE  6.3.  OFFSHORE  DEMAND  FOR  NORTH  AMERICAN  FEED  BARLEY
Subsidized  Nonsubsidized
(EEP)  Markets  Markets
Price  Elasticity  of  Demand  -3.1  -1.9
for  Barley
Avg.  Export  Price,  81  113
1986-91  ($/mt))
Avg.  N.  American  Exports,  2.0  2.2
1986-91  (million mt)
subsidy and the Canadian Wheat Board's control over shipments to offshore markets.  In
particular, the export price to nonsubsidized  markets is constrained to be less than or
equal to the subsidized price plus EEP bonus.  This is consistent with price discrimination
by the Canadian Wheat Board in its offshore  sales and Canadian success in capturing
unsubsidized  export markets." 3
Malting Barley Demand
Demand for malting barley is derived from the demand for malt, which is fixed by
region.  Barley is converted into malt at a fixed ratio:  1 ton of barley yields .75 tons of
malt. Malt production  location is endogenous in the model, and malt sourcing by brewers
reflects their variety  requirements, transportation  differentials, plant capacities,  and
vertical integration in the brewing industry.
There are 19 malt plant locations in the model:  13 in the United States  and 6 in
Canada.  Capacity constraints (equal to those reported  by the Canadian Wheat Board) are
applied to each malting location.
An important feature of the malting industry is that several of the larger brewers
have pursued  strategies  of vertical integration into the malting sector.  This structural
characteristic  was  built into the analytical  model in the form of constraints.  First, malt
produced by brewer-owned  plants is shipped exclusively to breweries within the same
company.  Second, brewer-owned  malt plants are constrained  to use 100% of their
capacity.
The two major export markets for malting barley are China and Mexico.  These
are representative of export markets served by different transportation linkages.  U.S.
barley is shipped by rail via El Paso to Mexico and via Portland to China.  Export
volumes of malting barley from the United States and Canada are fixed at recently
observed levels.
36In practice, U.S. exports to nonsubsidized markets have not been significant.
43Malt Demand
Malt demand is fixed by region.  There are 24 malt demand  regions in the model:
16 in the United States, 6 in Canada, and 2 offshore markets.  North American regions
are identified with states or provinces,  and demand quantities  are based on annual beer
production.
Different conversion factors apply for malt usage by Canadian and U.S. brewers.
In Canada, each barrel of beer requires  39.5 lbs of malt; in the United States, each barrel
requires 24 lbs of malt due to greater use of adjuncts.
U.S.  and Canadian brewers also have different malt quality requirements.  In
general, U.S.  beers make extensive use of malt produced with 6-rowed white aleurone
barley, while Canadian  beers rely heavily on 2-rowed varieties.  These requirements vary
by brewer, and the model accounts for this in demand specifications  for individual regions.
Malt requirements  for individual brewers were identified  through discussions with
industry representatives.  These are shown in Table 6.4.  Aggregate  domestic
requirements,  by type, are shown in Figure 6.4.
TABLE  6.4.  MALT  REQUIREMENTS  OF  BREWERS
Company  6-rowed  White  6-rowed  Blue  2-rowed
---------------  Percent  -------------
Anheuser-Busch  70  30
Miller  80-100  0-20
Coors  100
Other  U.S.  90-100  0-10
ILabatts  50  50
Other  Canadian  100
For each region, malt requirements  reflect market shares of individual brewers.
Market shares are calculated on the basis of local production  capacity.  For example,  malt
requirements  for Colorado reflect a weighted average of requirements for Coors and
Anheuser-Busch,  the two brewers with significant capacity in that state.
Tariffs
The U.S. import duty for barley is $1 per metric ton, while that for malt is $3 per
metric ton.  Canada does not impose import duties.  In individual model simulations,









umtea States  Canaaa
6.4.  Domestic Malt Use by Type, U.S.  and Canada, Base-case Assumptions
Transportation and Handling Costs
Barley Shipping Rates and Costs.  An important feature of barley spatial flows is
what we refer to as prairie-border-crossing  trade.  Some  barley trade flows across prairie
borders,  and some of the anticipated  changes  could result in greater flows through this
network.37  In this study, we  allow for prairie-border-crossing  trade explicitly as an
alternative flow.  Inclusion  of handling costs in each country as well  as direct shipment to
U.S. shipping stations (implicitly, transshipment points) provide a more realistic
explanation of the spatial competitive environment that has emerged.  Shipment
alternatives from prairie shipping points are illustrated in Figure  6.5.
Different flows are allowed in alternative simulations.  Table 6.5 defines cost
components used in this study and specifies those included  in alternative movements.
C,  and C,  are Canadian country and export elevation costs, respectively,  U, and Ue  are the
same for U.S.  elevators.  An Administrative charge, AF,  is applied for all shipments direct
from Canadian farms, F,, to U.S. shipping points.  This is intended  to reflect
merchandising charges  under the ex-farm-truck program  introduced in early 1993.
7Other studies using spatial equilibrium  modeling of North American grain flows (e.g.,
Faminow;  Golz,  Koo and Yang) do not allow  for prairie-border-crossing trade and,
therefore,  do not allow for this effect.  In addition, recent studies of Continental barley
ignored  these differences.  However, one of the principal conclusions  of the Carer report
was that "a continental market would provide incentives  for the industry to become more
efficient,  ..." (p. 35).
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6.5.  Alternative Shipping Routes From Farm Origins
TABLE  6.5.  ELELENTS  OF  SHIPPING
U.S.  AND  THIRD  COUNTRIES
COSTS  FOR  EXPORTS  FROM  CANADIAN  ORIGINS  TO
U.S.  Shipments  Third
Movement  East  West  Countries
T:  All  Truck  CC+TADz  C+TAD  Cc+TAD2 +
R'  :
Rail  (Rail  Subsidized)  Cc+Rs+R"us  CC+Rc  CC+RS+C,
TR:  Truck/Rail  AF+Tru+U+  RUS+Rusp  AF+ TFU,+Uc+ RUS  AF+TFU+Uc+ RU+Ue
R2 :  C+Rc+RuP  C+R  C+  +RC+C,
Rail  (Shipper  Subsidized)
46Specifically,  this is an intake fee charged  by accredited exporters to execute these
transactions.  Trucking is allowed  directly from Canadian  farms to U.S.  shipping points,
TFu, and from Canadian elevators to U.S. destinations,  TD2. The shipper portion of rail
rates from Canadian origins is defined as  Rs,  and the assumed compensatory rate level is
Rc.  Gathering rates for U.S movements  are defined  as R"g, and the proportional rail rate
for eastern U.S. shipments  is R"'".  R"U  is used to refer to a direct point-to-point rate.
Four alternative transport and handling regimes for Canadian shipments were
defined  and are illustrated, using this notation.  The alternative most reflective of current
and past marketing practices  includes  Min(T, R1).  This assumes that the CWB controls
exports via licenses, and likely results in a lesser amount shipped to (via) the United
States.
The free trade solution uses elements in a shipping matrix for these origins  as
Min(T,  R1, TR).  This implies that the routing allows for either direct rail, using the R";  an
all-truck movement;  or a truck/rail combination via U.S. shipping points.  A different
configuration of handling costs exists, depending on the routing.  In most cases,
particularly for the central and northern regions, R1 is the optimal routing.  However, TR
applies in some southern origins, implying shipments  by truck through the U.S.
marketing system.
Solutions using compensatory rates use elements  defined as Min(T, R2, TR).  This
allows for diversion of traffic from the Canadian handling and rail transport system to
either an all-truck movement or a TR combination.
Interior Barley Trucking.  The transport matrix allowed for shipment by either
rail or trucks, depending on relative rates and routings.  Truck rates were developed  in
the United States from industry sources  and were 45o  and 1500  per loaded mile for
movements with and without backhauls, respectively.  For Duluth the rate was  75v  per
loaded mile.  Trucks were assumed to ship  1,100 bushels.
Canadian trucking rates were computed  as a linear function of distance, using a
formula from industry sources.  Trucking rates were applied to all prairie-border-crossing
movements  and to intra-provincial movements.  For movements  within a province  for feed
use,  a distance of 50 miles was assumed.
Malt Shipping Rates.  All intra-U.S. movements were assumed to be shipped by
rail.  Rail tariffs were used where they existed, primarily for movements on BN and
CP/Soo.  For others, rates were approximated in one of two ways.  First, if a rate
representative  of that movement was shown in the 1991 Waybill Data, that rate was
used.  If not, a rate function was estimated, using regression techniques.  Specifically,
nonlinear regression equations  between rates and distance were estimated for each of four
interregional movements.
Rates for intra-Canadian movements were similarly derived.  The tariff rate for
movements  with published rates (mostly to Vancouver and Thunder Bay under WGTA)
were used.  Intra-provincial movements  from malt plants to breweries  are mostly by
truck, and the trucking cost was used with adjustments to account for the weight
differential  between malt and barley.
47The model allows for intercountry movements  of malt, which in practice is by rail.
However,  these rates either are under contract or are not available (i.e.,  because there are
no movements  to particular locations).  For these movements, the estimated  malt rate
function for the contiguous U.S. region was used.  The implicit assumption is that if a
cross-border malt movement occurs,  it would involve rail costs similar to those of the
contiguous  U.S. region.
Mathematical Specification
The model is specified  as a quadratic programming problem.  The objective is to
maximize the sum of producer and consumer surplus in feed barley markets minus the
costs of satisfying fixed  regional demands for malt.
Formally, let Xjk denote a shipment  ('000 mt) from producing region i to feed
demand region j.  The index k denotes  barley type.  There are 4 types of barley:  feed,  6-
rowed white malting, 6-rowed blue malting,  and 2-rowed malting.  The 4 types  are perfect
substitutes in feed  demand; however, only malting types are shipped to malt plants.  For
notational  convenience, we use the index h to refer to the subset of malting types.
Shipments  from  producing regions  to malt plants ('000 mt) are denoted Yim,  where m
identifies the malt plant location.  Shipments of malt ('000 mt) to beer production regions
are denoted  Zmh, where n identifies  the malt destination and h the malt type.  The
objective  function is defined:
W = E  f (aj - ,Qd  - EdEEX&7T
J  0  i  j  k
E  EYinhTYimi  E  E  E  TZDfmn
im  h  m  n  h
where  Qj is total barley feed use in region j
i  k
aj and  3j  are regional feed demand parameters;  and Txj, Tyim,  and Tzm  are transportation
cost parameters  ($/mt).  The latter include freight costs and handling margins,  as well as
applicable import tariffs and export subsidies.  Because barley supplies  are fixed, total
producer  and consumer surplus is represented by the area under regional demand
schedules less transportation costs.  The objective function is maximized  subject to
constraints on regional  feed use, barley supplies, malt plant capacities, brewer ownership
of selected malt plants, and malt requirements in beer production regions.
Prices for feed  barley in consuming regions and quantities used as feed  are
endogenous.  The model does not include producer prices per se; however, producer prices
can be computed  as a weighted average of the shadow prices associated with supply
constraints in producing regions.  Similarly, there are no malt prices in the model other
than the shadow  prices associated with demand constraints  at different points in the
marketing system.  These reflect the opportunity cost of malting barley (i.e., in terms of
its alternative feed use) in addition to transportation  and handling costs.
48The solution satisfies the usual assumptions of spatial equilibrium, no excess
demand in consuming regions and absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities.  However,
the United States discriminates  between offshore markets through its use of EEP
subsidies, while a constraint on price spreads ensures that Canada captures the
nonsubsidized  offshore market.
Data Sources
Production data used in this study were derived from several sources.  Data on
U.S. area planted, harvested, and yields were taken from  the USDA/NASS.  For Canada,
the same data were from Agriculture Canada  sources.  Data on barley quality were
developed  from Know Your Barley Varieties  (American Malting Barley Association) and
Barley Briefs (Malting Barley Research  Institute) for the United States  and Canada,
respectively.  Grade factor data in the United States were from  state-level quality reports,
and Canadian acceptance  rates are from Carter (p. 10).
Data for the United States brewing industry are from Brewers Almanac  1992,
published by the Beer Institute (Washington, DC.) and Brewer's Digest: 1991 Buyers
Guide and Brewery Directory; data for Canada are from the 1992 statistical bulletin of
the Brewers Association of Canada (Ottawa).  U.S. and Anheuser-Busch  beer production
capacities  at the state level were derived from  the Brewer Almanac and Anheuser-Busch
capacities  from  an Anheuser-Busch  pamphlet. U.S. and Canadian malt plant locations,
ownership,  and capacities  are those listed in the Canadian Wheat Board report.
Transport and handling costs are from a number of sources.  Rail rates were taken
from Burlington Northern and CP/Soo Line Tariffs in the 1991 Waybill  Data.  Canadian
rates were taken from CP and CN Rail Tariffs.  Trucking costs and formulas  and handling
costs were from  industry sources in each country.
7.  Simulation Results
The spatial model provides  a comprehensive  basis for studying impacts of trade
and agricultural policies, transportation rates, and supply conditions  on trade flows,
prices, and welfare.  Given the level of spatial disaggregation  and industry detail
embedded in the model, we do not present all simulation results in their entirety.  Rather,
we examine  a base-case simulation in detail and summarize results from other
simulations  by reference to several key variables:  average producer prices,  aggregate
trade flows, and national and regional market shares.
Our base-case assumptions  reflect a freer trade regime similar to that promoted by
Alberta Agriculture and endorsed by the Carter report.  Specifically, we assume  1)
quantitative restrictions do not apply to cross-border  flows of barley or malt; 2) Canada
does not regulate imports through the granting of permits;  3) current U.S. tariffs apply to
imports of barley and malt from Canada; 4) Canadian rail rates reflect current Crow
subsidies; and  5) cross-border truck/rail shipments  are allowed to U.S. barley destinations.
49The U.S. subsidy on barley exports  is set equal to $32/mt.  Regional barley
supplies are based on 5-year averages,  as described in the Section 6.  Other relevant
parameters are summarized in Table 7.1.  Departures from base-case assumptions  are
indicated where appropriate.
TABLE  7.1.  SELECTED  BASE-CASE  PARAMETERS  ('000  mt)
United  States  Canada
Domestic  Malt  Requirements  2,223  286
Offshore  Exports:
Malting  Barley  50  200
Malt  65  200
Results Under Base-case Assumptions
Results of the base-case simulations  are summarized in Table 7.2.  Of particular
interest is the large volume of feed barley exported from  Canada to the United States:
over 2.8 million metric tons.  This is substantially larger than historical trade levels and
much larger than previous estimates  (see p. 32 of the Carter report).38  Canada's
domestic feed use (2.9 million mt) is smaller than levels observed in recent years,
implying substantial substitution of other feedstuffs  for barley in Canadian demand.39
Canada also exports nearly 700 thousand mt of malting barley to the United
States.  Two-row malting barley accounts  for over  90 percent of these malting barley
exports.  The United States also exports  some malting barley to Canada under base-case
assumptions.  U.S. exports to Canada consist of 6-rowed white varieties; these are malted
in Canada for export to western U.S. breweries.
Average  producer prices are substantially higher in the United States than in
Canada.  U.S. producer prices are $1.81/bushel  (averaged over all U.S. producing regions
and barley types), while Canadian producer prices are $1.47/bushel.  Among other factors,
this difference reflects the proximity of U.S. producing regions to high-priced feed markets
and malting capacity.
Additional details on feed demand are provided in Table 7.3 and Figures  7.1 and
7.2.  California, Arizona, and Nevada represent the highest-priced  feed barley markets
due to transportation costs and expensive substitutes.  U.S.  prices are lowest in
38The Carter study and others were unduly conservative about trade flows.  Before the
September court decision that rescinded the Continental Barley Market, between  .5 and 1
million tons of Canadian barley were contracted with U.S. buyers (Milling and Baking
News,  Sept. 28,  1993,  p. 61).
39Regional demand schedules for feed barley were derived using prices of substitutes
observed in April, 1993.  In Canadian provinces,  prices reflected  an unusually large
supply of feed wheat, a result of quality problems in the 1992 crop.
50TABLE  7.2.  BASE-CASE  SIMULATION  RESULTS
United  Canada
States
Bilateral  Trade  Flows  ('000  mt)
Exports
Feed  barley  0  2,878
Malting  barley  134  682
Malt  0  156
Net  Bilateral  Trade  (exports  - imports)
Feed  barley  -2,878  2,878
Malting  barley  -548  548
Malt  -156  156
Offshore  feed  exports  ('000  mt)
Subsidized  markets  1,973  0
Nonsubsidized  markets  0  2,971
Domestic  Use  ('000  mt)
Feed  use  6,691  2,909
Malting  use  2,842  857
Avg.  Producer  Price  (US  $/mt)  83.3  67.4
(US  $/Bu)  1.81  1.47
midwestern barley-producing  states.  Prices in the prairie provinces are the lowest of all
regions.  This is consistent with actual relationships observed during the base period used
for estimating of demand schedules.
California represents the largest feed demand region, with barley feed use of 2.4
million mt.  Much of California's  feed demand is satisfied by exports from Canada (Figure
7.3).  The northwestern states (Oregon, Washington, and Idaho), which account for an
additional  1.9 million mt of feed barley demand, are also supplied extensively by Canada.
Figure 7.4 shows Canada's share of the U.S. malting barley market.  Canadian
exports of malting barley are especially significant to the U.S. West Coast.  The U.S.
Midwest,  where most U.S. malting capacity is located, is principally served by U.S.
producing regions.
Some specific commodity flows predicted  by the model are shown in Table 7.4.
Flows to individual demand regions are listed for 9 of the major producing regions, 5 in
the United States and 4 in Canada.
Northwest Minnesota, northeastern  North Dakota, and east central North Dakota
supply the Minnesota feed market and midwestern malt plants.  Northwestern  North
51TABLE  7.3.  PRICES  AND  QUANTITIES  IN  REGIONAL  FEED

































































































2.01  2,971.5  136.5
Dakota supplies the California feed market;  a substantial quantity of malting-quality
barley (6-rowed white) from this region is sold for feed.  Barley from Idaho is sent to the
Oregon feed market or exported under the EEP program;  small quantities of malting-
quality barley are shipped to Idaho malt plants or exported.
Barley from northern Alberta is directed mostly to feed markets in Alberta and
British Columbia.  Southern Alberta supplies barley to U.S. feed markets in California
and the northwest; malting barley is shipped to malt plants in Alix and Calgary, Alberta;
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88.5mainly in Wisconsin.  From  southern Saskatchewan,  barley flows to Montana and the
Saskatchewan feed market; malting barley is shipped to U.S. plants in Idaho and
Colorado.
Regional  flows provide perspective on the U.S. EEP program.  Under base-case
assumptions, subsidized U.S.  export shipments originate largely in Western Montana (898
tmt), Washington  (584 tmt), Oregon (247 tmt),  and Idaho (244 tmt).  Feed markets in each
of these states receive substantial inflows of barley from  adjoining regions, particularly
southern Alberta.  This highlights  the fungible  aspect of barley supplies.  The model does
not allow Canadian barley to qualify for U.S. export  subsidies; however, grain exported
under EEP can be replaced in U.S. markets by imports from Canada.
Impacts of U.S.  Import Restrictions
Under terms of the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,  the United States
retains its rights under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  This allows the
United States to restrict imports if they adversely  affect the operation of commodity
programs,  e.g., to prevent imports from raising the costs of producer supports.  Before the
Congressional vote on NAFTA, the United States threatened to invoke Section 22 to
curtail imports of Canadian wheat.  U.S. barley producers urged similar action in
response  to a surge of imports from Canada (occasioned by the temporary relaxation of
Canadian marketing controls in August,  1993).  Effects of U.S. barley imports on producer
prices will continue to be of policy interest, whether or not Canada undertakes major
reform in its marketing system.
To evaluate  implications  of these potential trade restrictions, we introduce import
quotas on barley in the base-case model.  By varying the quota level, we gauge the impact
of bilateral trade volumes on producer prices 40, domestic  feed use, and offshore exports.
Figure 7.5 shows the impact of different quota levels on average producer prices in
both countries.  A free-trade solution is represented  at 3.5 mmt of imports; U.S. import
quotas are no longer binding beyond that level.  With zero barley imports  from Canada,
the average price received by U.S. producers  is $87/mt, ($1.89/bu);  for Canadian
producers, the average price is US $58.5/mt ($1.27/bu).  With quotas no longer binding
(i.e., unrestricted  access  to the U.S. market),  the difference between U.S. and Canadian
producer prices narrows  substantially, by $12.6/mt  ($.27/bu).
With zero Canadian barley allowed into the United States, Canada's  domestic feed
use is 5.3 mmt, and U.S. feed use is 4.3 mmt (Figure 7.6).  Domestic feed use does  not
change significantly for the first 1.5 mmt of U.S. imports.  Rather, the volume of offshore
exports  by both countries  as the quota is increased (Figure 7.7):  Canada shifts its exports
away from offshore markets and to the United States, while U.S. exports  to offshore
(EEP) markets increase in step with imports from Canada.  For both countries, offshore
40With binding trade restrictions, Canadian producer  prices are calculated  as a
weighted average of shipment values.  Returns from Canada's domestic and offshore sales
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point, major adjustments occur in domestic feed use.
Using its authority under Section 22, the United States could also restrict imports
by increasing the tariff on Canadian barley.  The current U.S. tariff is $1/mt.  To evaluate
the efficacy  of higher tariffs  (as an alternative to import quotas),  additional model
simulations were performed:  U.S. tariff levels were raised incrementally,  while other base-
case assumptions were retained.  Results in Figure 7.8, suggest that U.S. tariffs  of
approximately $25/mt would  be necessary to curtail imports of barley from Canada.
Impacts of Compensatory Rail Rates
The Canadian government recently proposed  changes in the method of payment
for the Crow Benefit.  Existing subsidies, paid by the government  to the railroads, would
be converted into direct payments to producers over four years.4'  The ultimate  effects on
rail rates are difficult to predict; railroads  would be allowed to abandon some lines, but
would be under some pressure to maintain rates competitive with trucking.  In general,
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Figure 7.8.  U.S. Tariffs and Imports of Canadian Barley
4 ""Agriculture Canada proposes reform of grain transport system," Milling and Baking
News, July 6,  1993, p. 45.
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IFor purposes of simulation, rates for applicable Canadian rail movements  are
adjusted by the full amount of the Crow Benefit.  With fully compensatory  rates, shippers
pay the (additional) portion of rail rates formerly paid by the Canadian government.  This
raises the shipping rate to Vancouver  (for export) and Thunder Bay (for eastern
destinations).  In addition, these rail rates make prairie border-crossing movements more
attractive.
Figures  7.9 through  7.11 are comparable  to figures in Section 6; they summarize
results of simulations with compensatory rail rates.  Compensatory rates widen the gap
between U.S. and Canadian prices  (Figures 7.9 and 7.5).  Canadian exports  to offshore
markets  are reduced,  relative to the base case, because of higher shipping costs to
Vancouver.  With unrestricted  access to the U.S. market, Canada exports over 5 mmt of
barley to the United States, about half of total Canadian  production.
These results show that eliminating Canadian rail subsidies will not advance the
interests of U.S.  producers.  To the contrary,  as higher shipper costs depress barley prices
in Canadian  producing regions, cross-border  price differentials will widen, inducing larger
flows  of Canadian barley into the United States.
Impacts of the Export Enhancement Program
The intention  of the Export Enhancement Program is to stimulate U.S. exports
and pressure the European  Community to reduce its export subsidies.  However, as
demonstrated here, EEP also has an important  influence on North American barley flows.
U.S. export subsidies depress world prices and increase U.S. prices, thereby enhancing the
attractiveness  of U.S. markets relative to Canada's alternatives.  From a Canadian
perspective, EEP has been one of the most significant causes of ongoing bilateral disputes
over grain trade.
To quantify these effects, the model was simulated with alternative levels of the
EEP bonus (subsidy per metric ton).  Figure 7.12 is similar to Figure 7.5, but with
additional lines superimposed,  indicating the impact of a $40/mt bonus (25% higher than
in the base case) on producer prices in the United States and Canada.  As expected, the
higher EEP bonus raises average  U.S. producer prices.  The impact on Canadian prices is
negative at low levels  of bilateral trade (with U.S. imports constrained  to be less than 1.0
mmt).  At higher levels of bilateral trade, the higher EEP bonus has minimal impact on
Canadian producer prices:  depressed returns from offshore sales  are roughly offset by
higher returns from  U.S. sales (induced by higher U.S. domestic prices).
Figures  7.13 and 7.14 illustrate impacts  of different  subsidy levels on trade flows
and producer revenue, assuming no quotas  on U.S. imports from Canada.  The United
States does not export significant quantities of barley until the EEP bonus rises above
$20/mt; thereafter, U.S. exports increase, inducing larger imports from Canada.  The
United States remains  a net importer  of barley at all bonus levels considered  (Figure
7.13).  This suggests that, even if EEP were eliminated, there are substantial economic
inducements for Canadian sales into the U.S. market.
Exports account for a larger share of U.S.  producer revenue as the EEP bonus
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Figure  7.10.  Imports and Feed Use With Compensatory Rail
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Figure. 7.11.  Offshore Exports With Compensatory  Rail
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Figure  7.14.  Sources of U.S. Producer Revenue, Various EEP Bonus Levels
of U.S. producer revenue;  at $40/mt, they account  for a third.  With higher bonus levels,
the subsidy represents a major share of the value of U.S. exports.
Figure 7.15 shows the impact of EEP on Canadian producer revenue under
alternative  assumptions about bilateral trade.  When Canada's access to the U.S. market
is constrained by import quota, Canadian welfare drops precipitously  with increases  in
the EEP bonus above $25/mt.  This is essentially due to the price-depressing effects of
EEP in offshore markets.42  On the other hand, when Canada enjoys unrestricted  access
to the U.S. market, Canadian revenue is enhanced by higher EEP bonuses (above $35/mt).
Given the large volume of Canadian exports to the U.S., the positive effects of EEP on
United States domestic prices are more significant than the negative impact on Canada's
offshore sales revenue.
42With restricted access to the U.S. market, EEP bonuses in the $30-35 range appear
to be slightly more damaging to Canadian revenue than higher bonuses.  In model
simulations, the gap in offshore prices (between nonsubsidized  and EEP markets) is less
than the EEP bonus; hence, Canada's offshore  price does not fall in step with each
increase in the U.S. export subsidy.  However, higher EEP bonuses  (in the $40-$60 range)
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Figure 7.15.  Impact of EEP on Canadian Producer Revenue, Free Trade vs. Quota
Supply Conditions: Acreage and Varieties
Simulations  in this section analyze impacts of alternative supply conditions
relative to the base case.  First, we assess implications  of the Conservation Reserve
Program.  Specifically,  CRP acreage is returned to barley production in four major
producing states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana).43  Second, we
examine the impact of a shift in varieties planted in Canada.  In particular, we assume
that 25 percent of Canadian malting acreage is planted to 6-rowed white aleurone
varieties.  Results from  these simulations are compared  to the base case in Table 7.5.
Return of CRP acres to production would represent a 19% gain in total U.S. barley
output relative to the base case.  Total U.S. producer revenue would rise by 14% due to
increased barley output.  However, U.S. barley imports from Canada are reduced by only
7%,  because the rise in U.S. supply is accompanied  by a large increase in domestic feed
use.  Results suggest that the return of CRP acres to production would have little impact
on aggregate trade flows, although  average producer prices would fall in both countries.
Canada's  barley breeding programs and regulations  on variety release have limited
the availability of 6-rowed white aleurone varieties in Canada.  The Carter report (p. 9)
43Data on CRP acres were obtained from state ASCS offices.  At state level, the
following levels of barley base acreage had been enrolled in CRP:  Minnesota (230,789),
Montana  (710,739),  North Dakota  (539,705), and South Dakota (190,042).
63TABLE  7.5.  SIMULATIONS  WITH  ALTERNATIVE  SUPPLY  CONDITIONS
Restor  Canadian
Base  e  CRP  shift  to
Case  Acres  25%  6RW
U.S.  Barley  imports  from  Canada  ('000  3,559  3,320  3,681
mt)
Canada  share  of  U.S.  Feed  Barley  Market  43.0  34.0  38.7
(%)
Canada  share  of  U.S.  Malting  Barley  24.0  23.8  37.8
Market  (%)
U.S.  Average  Producer  Price  ($/mt)  83.3  80.3  83.0
Canada  Average  Producer  Price  ($/mt)  67.4  66.4  67.8
identified this as an important competitive disadvantage for Canadian barley, inasamuch
as most U.S. brewers have  a clear preference  for 6-rowed white varieties.  The trend
toward increased production of 6-rowed white varieties has already begun in Canada, with
some varieties being licensed and others grown under contract.
The next simulation assumes that 25% of Canada's current malting acreage  is
shifted into 6-rowed white varieties.  (Total Canadian acreage is unchanged with
compensating  declines in acres planted  to other malting varieties, including both 6-rowed
blue and 2-row.)  Results indicate that Canadian exports of malting barley to the United
States would increase to  1.07 million mt, from  .68 million in the base case.  Canada's
share of the U.S. malting barley market would increase  to nearly 38 percent.  This shift
would  have little impact on aggregate barley trade flows; offsetting the rise in Canada's
malting barley exports would be a decline in exports of feed barley to the United States.
Average producer prices in Canada would  be enhanced modestly, by the equivalent of 1
cent per bushel, and U.S.  prices would decline.
Retention of Wheat Board Control Over Barley
The foregoing simulations are premised on a competitive marketing environment:
without trade restrictions, shippers are free to sell barley wherever they receive the
highest price net of transportation  costs.  As a result, for each producing region in  the
model,  prices received (net of transportation) are equalized  across shipping destinations,
except when import quotas apply.
This ignores  one of the principal features  of Canada's current marketing system,
the role of the Canadian Wheat Board.  By virtue of its single-seller  status in Canada, the
CWB can price barley differently to U.S. and offshore markets and, so (in principle),
maximize returns to Canadian producers.  In fact, this a principal tenet of the Canadian
marketing system.  Price discrimination is closely linked to Canada's price pooling
mechanism; neither feature is consistent with the type of competitive market behavior
64implicit in our spatial model.44  However, the model can provide insight into the Board's
pricing and sales strategies.  By varying the level of exports to the United States, the
optimal trade volume from the Board's perspective can be identified,  i.e., that which
maximizes Canadian  producer revenue.
For of these simulations, Canadian imports of U.S. barley and malt are
constrained to zero; this is consistent with Canada's current practice of limiting imports
through a permit system.  Canadian barley exports to the United States are varied
incrementally, with Canadian  producer revenue  (aggregated across producing regions and
shipping destinations) evaluated  at each trade level.  These are similar to earlier
simulations,  which concerned  the effects of U.S. import quotas; however, here we also
allow Canadian exports to exceed  the competitive  "free-trade" solution.
For reference, Figure 7.16 shows that total welfare (comprising producer and
consumer surplus in all feed  barley markets less costs of satisfying fixed malt demand) is
maximized at about 3.5 million mt of Canadian exports  into the United States.  The
marginal value of Canadian exports to the United States45 is inversely related to export
volume.  For export volumes less than 3.5 mmt (the competitive free-trade  solution),
additional Canadian  exports to the United States are welfare enhancing.  For volumes
above 3.5  mmt, additional exports detract from total welfare.
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Figure 7.16.  Welfare Effects of CWB Barley Sales  to the U.S.
4As a practical matter, the price pooling mechanism depends on the Board's monopoly
position: if sales  by Canadian  producers  were unrestricted, then barley would  flow
through private market channels whenever prices trended upward.
45This is simply the shadow price associated  with the constraint fixing the volume of
Canadian exports to the United States.
65However,  Canadian producer revenue, rather than total welfare, is the relevant
criterion for CWB strategy.  Figure 7.17 provides a disaggregated view of welfare effects.
Canadian producer revenue is maximized  at about 6 million mt of exports to the United
States, far above the level consistent with competitive  free-trade conditions.  Increases  in
Canadian exports to the United States result in losses for U.S. producers and for
consumers in Canadian and offshore feed markets.46
Sources of Canadian producer revenue are shown in Figure 7.18 for various levels
of barley exports to the United States.  As revenues from  Canadian sales to the U.S.
market increase, revenues from other Canadian  sales (domestic and offshore) decrease.
Tradeoffs clearly exist between  Canada's external markets; the surprising aspect of these
results, in view of past analyses  by the Wheat Board, is that the Board's optimal strategy
is so heavily weighted  toward U.S. sales.
These results hinge on demand relationships  embedded in the model, in particular,
on relationships between prices received (net of transportation)  and elasticities in U.S.
and offshore feed markets.47  Feed markets in the model are price elastic, particularly
the U.S. regional markets.  Elasticities in the international  and Canadian markets are
lower.  Hence, the Board has an incentive to expand U.S. sales beyond levels consistent
with competitive equilibrium,  in effect,  absorbing a price discount for U.S. sales relative to
alternative markets.
Another feature  of the model is relevant to this discussion.  The price received for
Canadian offshore sales (i.e., to non-EEP markets) is constrained to be less than the U.S.
export price plus the EEP bonus.  When this constraint is binding, U.S. and Canadian
export prices are directly linked.  However,  when it is not binding, Canada can push
barley into the U.S. market without suffering any direct, price-depressing effects  in
offshore markets.  This is contrary to contentions  by the Wheat  Board (in the context of
debate over the Continental Barley Market) that higher exports to the U.S. Pacific
Northwest would necessarily lower Canadian returns from  offshore sales.  Such a result is
possible, but not necessary,  in the context of this spatial model.
46Total welfare is smaller than the sum of components represented  in Figure 7.17;
missing from the figure are costs of satisfying fixed demands for malt.
47A discriminating monopolist equates marginal revenue across markets.  In a two-
market context, this leads to the familiar condition:
MR,  = pI(l  +  1/eI)  =  P2(1  +  /e2)  =  MR,
where  ei represents the price elasticity of demand in market i and pi is the market price
(net of transportation  cost in this context).  With manipulation this becomes
Pi  _  81E2  +  e1
P2  8182  + 82
Assuming ei<0 and leib1 (i=1,2), it  is clear that if the first market is more price elastic
(i.e., lel >  le21),  then p/p 2<l.
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Figure 7.18.  Canadian Producer Revenue, Various Levels of CWB Sales to U.S.
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r,.,.1  D  ........The main implication bears emphasis:  retention of Wheat Board control may not
lessen the pressure for sales of barley into the U.S. market.  Indeed,  to the extent that
U.S. markets are more price elastic than Canada's offshore  alternatives,  as assumed here
and as suggested in the Carter report, then the Board would have an incentive  to expand
U.S. sales beyond the level that would be consistent with a competitive marketing system
in Canada.
8.  Summary and Discussion
Barley trade between the United States and Canada has traditionally been
negligible.  However, recent changes in the policy, and the institutional and competitive
environment have resulted in increased trade and increased tensions within and between
these countries.  Some of these hold potential for drastic changes in competitive
relationships and spatial flows.  This study has analyzed  effects of selected trade,
agricultural,  and marketing policies on trade flows, prices, price differentials,  and welfare.
These include impacts of free trade in North American barley, potential trade restrictions,
and the U.S.  Export Enhancement Program (EEP).  In addition, impacts of selected
marketing policies were analyzed.
The North American market for malting and feed barley has a number of
important characteristics.  In general, there is surplus production  of malting-quality
barley; supplies  above malting requirements  can be sold in the feed market.  The U.S.
west coast is the largest market for feed barley.  Competition for this market is
accentuated  by the distance of midwest corn supplies,  and shortage of local feed grains.
There are notable  differences in barley quality in North America.  The United States
generally has a surplus of 6-rowed white aleurone malting barley, but is relatively short
of 2-rowed white malting varieties.  Canada has only a minor production of 6-rowed white
aleurone malting barley, the type preferred by U.S. brewers, but is a large surplus
producer of 2-rowed  varieties.  However, Canadian grading practices (and possibly  sales
opportunities) have restricted the quantity of barley that is sold for malting.  Historical
acceptance rates for Canadian malting barley have been less than in contiguous U.S.
producing regions..
Several agricultural  and trade policies have important effects on trade flows in the
North American  market.  First is the U.S. EEP program.  The effect of this policy is to
distort U.S. domestic  prices relative to international  and, therefore, Canadian prices.  As a
result, arbitrage pressures exist to sell Canadian barley into the U.S. market.  Exports
from North America have been dominated by sales from Canada, with U.S. sales largely
being subsidized.  Second  is the rail subsidy mechanism in Canada.  The effect of
changing this policy is to depress prairie barley prices and provide incentives to ship
barley to the United States.  Several policies affect acreage and the composition of barley
supply in North America.  The role of the Canadian Wheat Board, whose objective is to
maximize Canadian producer revenue, also has important implications for trade flows.
The dynamics of the North American malt and beer industries  are significant.
Although the malt industry is fairly concentrated, the brewing industries have greater
potential  for exerting market power in North America.  Both beer consumption  and malt
utilization per barrel have been decreasing, resulting in a declining domestic market.  The
malt industries in both countries have always had excess capacity relative to domestic
68beer demand, and this has increased in recent years, a trend likely to continue.  Malt
exports are of greater importance to the Canadian malting industry than to that of the
United States.
Summary
A mathematical programming  model was used to analyze  North American barley
flows.  The United States and Canada were divided into different producing and
consuming regions; to these were added several export markets for barley and malt.
Barley supplies and domestic  malt demands were taken as exogenous.  The model was
used to analyze impacts of policies  on trade flows, prices,  and welfare.
The base-case  simulations assumed  average supply conditions for 1987 to 1991,
domestic North American  demand reflecting  1992  livestock inventories and beer
production, export demand  functions reflecting conditions  since the 1980s,  and current
transport rates and handling costs.  Both traditional  and nontraditional  (e.g.,  crossing
prairie-border) flows were allowed.
The model was used  to identify optimal trade flows and corresponding  prices
under a freer trade regime, similar to that which would have evolved under the
"Continental Barley" proposal: unrestrictive  bilateral trade in barley  and malt, import
duties imposed by the United States, subsidized rail rates in Canada,  and EEP bonuses of
$32/mt for U.S. export sales.  The model was also used to analyze impacts of alternative
policies.  These are summarized  below:
*  A freer trade solution would result in nearly 3.5 mmt of U.S. barley imports from
Canada,  including over 2.8 mmt of feed barley.  Most of this is sold in western
U.S. feed markets.  Canadian malting exports to the U.S.  consist largely of 2-
rowed white varieties sold to malt plants located in the western United States.
Exports to others markets are restricted to some extent because Canadian  6-rowed
production  is mostly 6-rowed  blue, which has limited acceptance  by U.S. brewers.
*  U.S. import quotas would have several important  effects.  By definition, imports
would be reduced  from the base-case solution.  If imports were eliminated, the
price spread between United States and Canada would increase from 27c/bu in a
free-trade solution to 62c/bu.  The disposition of barley supplies is  also changed  by
imposing quotas, and Canada shifts its exports from the United States to offshore
markets.
The United States could also impose a tariff to restrict imports under its Section
22 Authority.  However, the tariff would have to be approximately  25$/mt to
completely restrict imports from  Canada.
*  One of the more important policies affecting prairie-border-crossing  barley flows is
the rail subsidy regime used in Canada.  Eliminating this policy will severely alter
barley flows.  In particular, increasing Canadian rail rates depresses Canadian
prairie barley prices, so that prairie-border-crossing  shipments  become the optimal
movement for a significant portion of Canadian barley.  Results indicate that the
69equilibrium quantity of barley exported from Canada to the United States
increases from 3.5 to 5 mmt under this scenario.  Because of this policy change,
Canadian and U.S. prices are reduced,  Canadian exports to offshore markets are
reduced, and those to the U.S. are increased.
*  The EEP program  also has an impact  on both North American barley flows and
producer welfare.  In particular, increases in EEP bonuses increase the
U.S.domestic  price relative to the international market.  Because of this disparity,
U.S.  barley imports  from Canada increase.
Simulation results indicate that even if EEP were eliminated, the United States
would continue to be a net importer from Canada.  With EEP bonuses less than
$20/mt, U.S. exports  are nil.  With higher subsidy levels, gains in U.S. producer
revenue from export  sales are partly offset by losses in revenue from the domestic
market.
Canadian producer revenue  drops sharply with EEP bonuses  above $25/mt and
restricted access to the U.S. export market.  However, with unrestricted  access to
the U.S. market, Canadian revenue increases with a rise in the EEP bonus  level;
this is due to being able to sell in the higher priced U.S. market, replacing the
U.S. barley that is exported under subsidy.
*  Two important policies  affect the supply and composition of barley in North
America.  First is the U.S. CRP program, in which  an important share of barley
base is removed from production.  In model simulations, eliminating this program
has the impact of increasing  U.S. supply by 19%  and increasing  U.S. producer
revenue by 14%.  Prices are lowered in both countries.  Much of the increased
production is used for feed, and U.S. imports from Canada are reduced  by 7
percent.
Second, Canadian regulations on the release of barley varieties  affect the
composition  of barley supply.  Already, Canada has shifted toward  6-rowed white
varieties.  If 25% of Canadian area were shifted into production  of 6-rowed white
varieties,  Canada's share of the U.S. malting barley market would increase  from
24% to 37.8 percent.
S  The role of the Canadian Wheat Board in a North American barley market has
major implications.  While this has been a source of much controversy within
Canada  (as evidenced  by the evolution of recent policies),  it also affects
equilibrium trade levels.
As  sole-seller agency, the CWB has an objective of maximizing the revenue
received by Canadian producers.  Discriminatory pricing and strategic allocation  of
sales among customers  are essential components  of the overall  CWB strategy.
This requires that the CWB sell barley wherever marginal  revenues are highest,
in effect, equalizing marginal revenues across markets.
In our analysis, U.S. market elasticities are greater than those in Canada's
offshore and domestic markets.  Under these circumstances, Canadian producer
70revenue is maximized with sales to the U.S. of about 6.0 mmt compared to 3.5 in
the competitive base-case solution.  This results in losses for U.S. producers and
for consumers in Canadian and offshore feed markets,  but gains to U.S.
consumers.
In practice,  actual conditions in a particular year may vary from  those chosen for
our base case.  While market conditions  may evolve in unforeseen ways, we have
confidence in our qualitative results and in general conclusions drawn from  our policy
simulations.
Policy  Discussion
Numerous pressures are being exerted  on the North American barley market.
Ultimately, these stem from policies  and marketing institutions that have evolved
independently in the United States and Canada.  In combination, these factors  have led to
distortions  in prices within North America,  increased imports of Canadian barley into the
United States, and pressures to make drastic alterations in the Canadian marketing
system.
In each country, existing policies  and institutions are challenged  by the evolution
of a more open trading environment for barley and malt.  The results of this study
suggest several conclusions  which are important to current policy debates:
1.  Given the geographical distribution  of demand and supply, relative demand
elasticities and transport and handling costs, economic pressures  exist for
increased movement  of Canadian barley to the United States.  This volume
is greater than estimated in previous  studies (which maintained fairly
restrictive assumptions).  A positive level of imports would  exist even
without the EEP program.  However, the equilibrium level of imports
increases in response to EEP bonuses, reductions  in U.S. planted acreage
due to CRP or other programs,  and elimination of direct payment  of the
WGTA subsidy to Canadian railroads.
2.  Both the CRP and EEP programs were conceived  in an era when barley
imports from  Canada were negligible.  However, under freer trade and
without any mechanism for bilateral policy coordination, these programs
increase imports from  Canada and reduce U.S. producer revenue from
domestic sales.  Increased  EEP bonuses expand the volume of U.S. exports;
however, the impact on U.S. producer prices is mitigated by increased
imports of Canadian barley.  This confronts  the United States with a
strategic choice: whether  to pursue a policy of increasing exports via EEP or
to protect the U.S. domestic market.
3.  Section  22 provides a mechanism  to protect the U.S. market from import
competition.  Imposing import quotas (or significant tariffs) would increase
U.S. producer revenue and lower Canadian producer revenue.
4.  Changes in the Crow rate subsidy mechanism have been controversial in
Canada and a focus  of ongoing trade disputes.  Allegations  are made that
71this subsidy provides  an unfair trade advantage to Canada and is one
reason for the increased volume of trade.  However,  our results demonstrate
that eliminating of this subsidy (by paying growers directly)  increases the
flow of Canadian  barley to the United States.  This is due to the relative
costs of alternative  logistical channels  and opportunities  for spatial
arbitrage, which were not considered under previous marketing
arrangements.
5.  These results also provide perspective on issues for the Canadian marketing
system.  First, the Canadian price pooling mechanism,  as traditionally
administered, is generally incompatible with high spot prices  in contiguous
U.S. regions.  Second, the fact that past exports from Canada to the United
States have been substantially less than levels  indicated by the model
suggests  that the CWB has been underselling barley into the U.S. market.
There are many potential reasons for this, but the political repercussions  of
large U.S.  sales may be foremost.  Third, the mechanisms that regulate
malting barley in Canada, notably grading factors and policies for variety
release, represent constraints on Canadian exports.
Two  general observations  are offered  on the long-term  prospects  for North
American barley trade.  First, trade tensions will persist unless some effort is made to
coordinate policies.  The United States should not unilaterally pursue policies (i.e.,
acreage controls or export  subsidies) without greater coordination  and consultation with
Canada.  Without this coordination, the use of such policies by the United States should
be reevaluated.  Second, although the marketing systems in these two countries (including
mechanisms related to pricing, transport, handling, and quality control) differ drastically,
some convergence  should be expected in the long run as a result of movement toward a
more open trade environment.
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